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TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE DEFINITION
OF INSURANCE: THE CONTINUING
EXAMINATION OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE
COMPANIES
Donald Arthur Winslow*
Both courts and commentators have disagreed on the abil-
ity of a corporation to take expense deductions for property
and casualty insurance premiums paid to their captive insur-
ance subsidiaries. This Article explains that the dispute over
captives has been obscured in the debates. Both sides have
framed their arguments around the technical presence or ab-
sence of insurance. Instead, the resolution of the dispute re-
quires a choice between competing tax doctrines - economic
reality and separate corporate entities. This choice is based
upon a decision as to what arrangements constitute impermissi-
ble tax avoidance, not upon a strained and often inaccurate def-
inition of insurance.
HEATED DEBATES SELDOM occur in cases concerning theincome tax' treatment accorded large business corporations.
Nevertheless, tax lawyers will argue passionately over issues that
test their notions of the tax system's basic structure. A bitter split
of the Tax Court judges over such an issue has proved that point.
This disagreement has surfaced in a line of cases concerning cor-
porations' asserted expense deductions for property and casualty
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fornia at Los Angeles; M.B.A. 1979, J.D. 1980, Cornell University. The author acknowl-
edges with appreciation the valuable comments on earlier versions of this Article by Profes-
sors Erik M. Jensen, Stephen J. Vasek, Scott Taylor, Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and
Norman Stein and William H. Bradley, Esq. and Bruce Taten, Esq.
1. References to I.R.C. sections are to the current version of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 unless otherwise specified. The year in parentheses is the year of the most
recent publication of the United States Code, not the most recent version of the Internal
Revenue Code. References to Treasury regulations are to the regulations currently in force,
unless otherwise specified.
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insurance premiums paid to their captive insurance subsidiaries.'
The issue of the propriety of these deductions has split the com-
mentators as well.3
In a typical captive insurance arrangement, a parent or other
affiliate purchases insurance from an insurance corporation that is
wholly owned by it or by a member of its corporate family.' The
insured generally claims a current deduction for the insurance
premium as a business expense, 5 and the captive insurer, while
including the premiums in gross income, claims the benefit of spe-
cial deductions afforded insurance companies under subchapter L
of the Internal Revenue Code.' Historically, subchapter L deduc-
2. The diversity of authority cited in the opinions by the Tax Court judges matches
the strength of feeling on either side of the issue, with one judge drawing an analogy from
an old television program, Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 964
(1985) (Jacobs, J., concurring), a f'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), and another turning
to Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. Humana Inc. v. Commissioner,
88 T.C. 197, 224 (1987) (Kdrner, J., concurring and dissenting in part), aff d in part and
rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989). The matter appears to have reached a head in
the recent Tax Court decision of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987),
with five separate opinions indicating a deep dispute over the issue.
Captive insurance subsidiaries will be referred to as the "captive" or "captives"
throughout this Article.
3. Compare O'Brien & Tung, Captive Off-Shore Insurance Corporations, 31 INST.
ON FED. TAX'N 665 (1973) (premium payments deductible only if captive has capacity to
make losses good, more likely when captive insures other affiliates); Barker, Federal In-
come Taxation and Captive Insurance, 6 VA. TAX REV. 267 (1986) (premiums to captives
deductible only to extent that captive is owned by other interests) and Taylor, Taxing
Captive Insurance: A New Solution for an Old Problem, 42 TAX LAW. 859 (1989) [herein-
after Taylor, Taxing Captive] (captive arrangement should be attacked from the side of
the insurer) with Knight & Knight, Disregarding the Separate Corporate Entity of Cap-
tive Insurance Companies: A Violation of the Moline Properties Doctrine? 1988 J. CORP.
L. 399 (the premium deduction should be allowed in keeping with the Moline Properties
doctrine); Bradley & Winslow, Self-Insurance Plans and Captive Insurance Compa-
nies- A Perspective on Recent Tax Developments, 4 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 217 (1985) (so long
as captive not a sham, premiums may be deductible) and Sachs, Principles for Taxing
Foreign Captive Insurance Companies, 1 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 45 (1982) (as long as captive is
financially capable of carrying risks insured, there is no compelling reason to deny the
premium deduction).
4. See Goshay, Captive Insurance Companies, in RISK MANAGEMENT 84 (H.W.
Snider ed. 1964). The parent company may insure with its subsidiary, or a more compli-
cated arrangement may be used. For example, a parent may own several operating subsidi-
aries and an insurance subsidiary that insures the other members of the corporate family.
If the parent is primarily a holding company, the insurance subsidiary or captive would do
the bulk of its insurance business with its brother and sister corporations, and not with the
parent corporation.
5. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1960).
6. See I.R.C. §§ 801-846 (Supp. V 1987). For example under I.R.C. § 832(b)(5),
(c)(4) (Supp. V. 1987), insurance companies can deduct currently amounts that will be
paid in the future with respect to "losses incurred" in the current period. Treas. Reg. §
[Vol. 40:79
CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES
tions have resulted in the insurer realizing little or no taxable in-
come. Currently, they provide the insurer with favorable tax treat-
ment not allowed to taxpayers generally. As a result, a corporate
group utilizing a captive arrangement has been able to decrease
substantially its taxable income without making a payment
outside the corporate group.
The courts, in response to challenges by the Internal Revenue
Service (the "Service" or "IRS") to the insureds' deductions of
the premium expenses, have almost uniformly rejected the taxpay-
ers' position with respect to these arrangements. This rejection,
which has drawn some support from scholarly works,1 has been
premised essentially on the ground that the transactions between
affiliated corporations do not rise to the level of insurance for tax
purposes. The perceived flaw has been a failure to effect the requi-
site risk transfer or risk shifting outside of the affiliated or eco-
nomically related group.'
The courts have reached these conclusions despite the vigor-
ous objections of a number of dissenting judges as well as several
commentators.9 The opposition has argued that in denying an in-
surance characterization because of the affiliation of the corpora-
tions the courts have improperly ignored the separate corporate
existence of the contracting entities, a legal fiction that is gener-
1.832-4 (1963). Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3 at 217 n.1; Note, Federal Taxation
Concepts in Corporate Risk Assumptions: Self-Insurance, The Trust, and the Captive In-
surance Company, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 781 (1978) [hereinafter FORDHAM Note].
7. See Barker, supra note 3. Cf. Taylor, Captive Insurance: A Review and Criticism
of Recent Developments, Coupled with a Proposed Solution, 41 TAX NOTES 447 (1988)
[hereinafter Taylor, Captive Insurance] (captive arrangements should be attacked from the
side of the insurer not from the side of the insured).
8. See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987),
affg 84 T.C. 948 (1985); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.
1986); Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985); Carnation
Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981), affg 71 T.C. 400 (1978); Humana
Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247
(6th Cir. 1989) (affirming the applicability of the risk shifting and risk distribution stan-
dard to captive arrangements, but holding that brother-sister corporations may meet that
standard); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985). But cf. Crawford Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F.
Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (captive with multiple owners respected).
9. See, e.g., Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3; Liles, Captive Insurance Companies:
Further Confusion over Economic Families?, 26 TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 17, at 226 (Au-
gust 19, 1985); Sachs, supra note 3; Tinsley, Why Revenue Ruling 77-316 Is Wrong: A
Captivating Argument, 9 J. CORP. TAX'N. 142 (1982); FORDHAM Note, supra note 6. See
also O'Brien & Tung, supra note 3 (because captive insurance companies fill a need not
met by existing insurance companies, their transactions should be accepted as insurance for
tax purposes).
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ally respected by the tax law.
The debate has grown louder recently because of two star-
tling breaks from the developing case law which had favored the
government's position. In the late 1987 decision of Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner,'0 a majority of the Tax Court judges indicated
in dicta that they would allow premium deductions by the in-
sureds' in some captive arrangements. The instability of the devel-
oping doctrine was further illustrated by the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Humana Inc. v. Commissioner," in which the propriety of
some premium expense deductions were upheld but by reasoning
significantly different from that used by the Gulf Oil majority.
These developments show the need to reexamine the basic
captive insurance company issue. In light of the strong and persis-
tent disagreements over this issue and the emergence of some de-
gree of conflict in the judicial decisions, the nature of the conflict
in the captive cases should be reassessed, including its root causes.
Each side recognizes only its own position and has difficulty per-
ceiving any merit in the opposition's. The government and some
courts have failed to give a satisfactory reason for denying the
asserted tax treatment for captives, or even acknowledge that the
cases raise a potential conflict with the general respect accorded
separate corporate entities. Similarly, the opposition has clung
steadfastly to a technical definition of insurance in order to sup-
port its own conclusions. Still, there are difficulties even with the
distinctions, based on definitional approaches, suggested in Gulf
Oil and Humana to permit the premium expense deductions in
some cases.
The definition of insurance has also gained attention outside
the captive context. As the industry market for insurance has
moved away from the simple model of a small insured covering its
risks with a large, unrelated insurance company for a fixed pre-
10. 89 T.C. 1010 (1987) (writing of unrelated insurance business can result in char-
acterization of parent's arrangements with captive as insurance).
11. 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989), afl'g in part and rev'g in part, 88 T.C. 197
(1987). The Sixth Circuit "ruled that while parent corporations cannot deduct premiums
they pay directly to their wholly owned insurance companies, their subsidiaries are entitled
to tax deductions paid to the captives." Adler, Captive Premiums Deductible: Court Rul-
ing is First Major Victory For Captive Insurers, Bus. Ins., August 7, 1989, at 1, col. 2
[hereinafter Adler, captive Premiums] (Sixth Circuit's decision in Humana may open
floodgates on captive issue due to deliberate restructuring of captive arrangements as a
result of the court's holding). See also Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d
1297 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding of insurance for tax purposes must focus on whether risk of
loss has been actually shifting by parent corporation), affg 84 T.C. 948 (1985).
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mium, there has been significant focus on the definition of insur-
ance to see how it relates to modern arrangements. These arrange-
ments include captives as well as alternatives to conventional
insurance arrangements, such as self-insurance or absence of in-
surance coverage. All may produce tax issues similar to those
faced in the captive context and substantial matters such as the
deduction of asserted premiums and treatment as an insurance
company under subchapter L often hinge upon the definition of
insurance. Furthermore, even when insurance is said to consist of
risk shifting and risk distribution, 12 the meaning of and distinction
between these basic elements has not been clearly articulated by
the tax authorities.
In order to accomplish the goals of rethinking the captive dis-
pute and developing some principles by which to define insurance
in anticipation of disputes in other insurance contexts, this Article
will focus on the captive insurance cases. It will outline the cur-
rent circumstances that make desirable a definition of insurance
for tax purposes'13 and then review the ambiguities in the tax au-
thorities defining insurance.' 4 In light of this background, the Ar-
ticle will then examine the nature of the dispute in the captive
cases.
This reexamination will show that the dispute over captives
has often been obscured by the debaters.'x Both sides present their
arguments as if the captive issue concerned only the technical
presence or absence of the insurance element of risk shifting. The
courts, the parties, and the commentators have failed to focus on
the underlying issue: a conflict between tax doctrines - economic
reality' 6 and separate corporate entities.'7 This conflict intersects
in an unusual fashion in the captive context, providing the poten-
tial for an extraordinary reduction of taxes. At stake is the loca-
12. See generally Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941) (stating that an in-
surance contract requires risk shifting and risk distribution).
13. See infra text and accompanying notes 21-52.
14. See infra text and accompanying notes 53-82.
15. See infra text and accompanying notes 86-137.
16. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (transaction deemed a
sham when the tax deduction was the only substantive thing realized); Gregory v. Helver-
ing, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (deduction disallowed because the corporate reorganization's sole
purpose was to reduce taxable income).
17. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943) (As long
as the purpose of a corporate entity "is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by
the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate corpo-
rate entity.").
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tion of the line dividing permissible tax minimization and imper-
missible tax avoidance. Because of the nature of the captive issue
and the status of insurance theory, the line must be drawn more
finely than is usual in anti-tax avoidance analysis if the taxpayer's
position is to be challenged. This difficulty partially explains why
the conflict has long defied satisfactory resolution or even full
understanding.
This recognition prompts two conclusions. First, the captive
issue should not be resolved by a purported definition of insurance,
but by an expressly recognized choice between the tax doctrines in
question. This conclusion requires that the issue be resolved with
minimal assistance from outside sources, such as an economist's
definition of insurance. Second, captive cases should yield few
principles on insurance and risk shifting that are applicable to
cases regarding other insurance products. This is because
problems present in the captive context are best dealt with by
other solutions, and not by manipulating the definition of insur-
ance. We should resolve this issue as a matter of tax law rather
than one of insurance theory. The tax authorities have provided
few clear answers by overemphasizing the technical definition of
insurance.
The Article will evaluate the possibility that an analysis fo-
cusing upon what arrangements constitute impermissible tax
avoidance could be used to distinguish between captive arrange-
ments. The possibility of distinguishing between different types of
captive arrangements was suggested in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commis-
sioner,18 the Tax Court's recent decision which contains the first
substantial indication from the judiciary that single parent cap-
tives may be respected under some circumstances. 19 This Article
will explore the feasibility of several approaches to making such a
distinction.
Finally, the Article will examine risk distribution, an aspect
of insurance theory that has not been developed by the cases. This
exercise will reinforce the conclusion that the conflict over com-
peting tax doctrines is unavoidable because insurance theory can-
not dispose of the issue.2"
18. 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).
19. See infra text and accompanying notes 261-90. But cf. Crawford Fitting Co. v.
United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (captive with multiple owners
respected).
20. See infra text and accompanying notes 142-96.
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I. THE INCREASED PRESSURE ON THE DEFINITION OF
INSURANCE
In recent years, increasing attention has been focused on the
definition of insurance for purposes of federal income taxation. As
a result, tension has arisen in a variety of contexts. Taxpayers
have sought to have various arrangements for coverage of property
and casualty risks classified as "insurance" in order to obtain a
current tax deduction for the obligation to pay premiums. The re-
sulting controversy raises the question of whether it is possible to
resolve these cases by continuing the present course of attempting
to define the elements of insurance. If the attempt at definition
proves problematic, an alternative must be found.
A. The Issues Involved in Defining Insurance
The definitional issues arise in the context of the wide variety
of "cash flow" programs now available to provide coverage of
property and casualty risks.21 Captive insurance arrangements,
constitute the most visible of these programs because of the large
and growing number of litigated captive cases. However, cash flow
programs also include other "loss sensitive" insurance arrange-
ments, such as retrospectively rated insurance programs.22 In ad-
dition, this conflict in the insurance area extends to less widely
used arrangements such as retroactive insurance23 which provides
coverage for events that have already occurred. Issues getting full
exposure in the captive cases resemble those that could likely be
litigated in other cash flow programs.
At issue in the various cash flow programs is the general rule
relating to self-insurance. Liabilities not covered by an insurance
contract, such as a future liability arising from a tort claim, are
said to be self-insured by the party at risk.24 Under an established
line of cases, a self-insured party cannot accrue a current deduc-
tion for self-insured liabilities. 25 Thus, in the absence of an obliga-
21. See generally Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3 (discussing case law that defines
self-insurance and captive insurance programs).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
24. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 220-26.
25. See, e.g., Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930),
aff-g 13 B.T.A. 189 (1928); Greenville Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 1323 (1926),
acq. 1927-2 C.B. 3; L.A. Thompson Scenic Ry. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 664 (1925);
Pan-American Hide Co. v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 1249 (1925).
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tion to make a premium payment to another party under an insur-
ance arrangement, the taxpayer would not have a current
deduction relating to the liabilities.
The inability to get a current deduction for self-insurance
(i.e., the absence of insurance) set the stage for the insurance ar-
rangements now in question. If a deduction for self-insured losses
could be accelerated to take advantage of the time value of
money,26 the taxpayer would receive the financial benefit associ-
ated with an earlier tax deduction. Given the desirability of a
current deduction, the early defeats of self-insurers possibly gave
rise to the proliferation of captive insurance companies. 8 Retroac-
tive and retrospectively rated insurance programs are designed to
achieve the same goals and purport to offer many of the same
benefits, making them additional alternatives to self-insurance. 9
Retrospectively rated insurance attracts those considering
self-insurance by its retrospectively adjustable premium mecha-
nism. Premium rates are adjustable based on experience within
26. The time value of money has generated a significant body of scholarly tax litera-
ture in recent years. See, e.g., Cannelos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest:
Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 TAX L. REV. 565 (1983); Cunningham, A Theoreti-
cal Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Future Costs, 40 TAX L. REV. 577 (1985); Gunn,
Matching Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1984)
[hereinafter Gunn, Matching Costs]; Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time
Value of Money", 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) [hereinafter Halperin, Interest]; Jensen, The
Supreme Court and the Timing of Deductions for Accrual-Basis Taxpayers, 22 GA. L.
REV. 229 (1988) [hereinafter Jensen, The Supreme Court]; Jensen, The Deduction of Fu-
ture Liabilities by Accrual-Basis Taxpayers: Premature Accruals, the All Events Test,
and Economic Performance, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 443 (1985); Lokken, The Time Value of
Money Rules, 42 TAX L. REV. 1 (1986). Taxpayers generally prefer to defer recognition of
income and to accelerate recognition of deductible items. It has been observed that:
The effect of deferring income, prepaying an expense, or lending at below-mar-
ket interest rates can be to avoid tax on the investment income to be derived
from investment of the amount so deferred, prepaid, or loaned, or to shift the tax
burden on such income to the other party to the transaction.
Halperin, The Time Value of Money 1984, 23 TAX NOTES 751, 751-52 (1984). A simple
example is an interest-free loan. In such a case, "if the form of the transaction were
respected (i.e., neither the payment nor the receipt of interest were imputed), an interest-
free loan would enable the lender to avoid tax and would overtax the borrower if interest
she would have paid would have been deductible." Halperin, Interest, supra, at 513.
27. Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 219.
28. See Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 216 (1987) (Whitaker, J., con-
curring), affd in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989); Bradley & Wins-
low, supra note 3, at 219. See generally P. BAWCUTT, CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES
(1982) (discussing captives as an alternative to self-insurance).
29. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 217-19. See generally R. GOSHAY,
CORPORATE SELF-INSURANCE AND RISK RETENTION PLANS 42 (1964) (discussing the abil-
ity of retrospectively rated insurance to appeal to would-be self-insurers).
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the policy period, so that the insured does not have a completely
fixed premium coverage.30 From the insured's perspective, the de-
ductibility of the premium amounts for insurance as a business
expense is a chief concern.31 In general, the insurer will also desire
the arrangement to be considered insurance in order to support its
treatment as an insurance company under subchapter L, sus-
taining its current deduction of "losses incurred" with respect to
the policy. 2 Although the terms of the retrospectively rated plans
are subject to substantial variation, with a principal variant being
the range of permitted premium adjustments, 33 the financial goals
are similar to those of the captive arrangements. The premium
expense is structured to correspond to actual loss experience. In
some cases, actual payment of the premium is deferred until pay-
ment of the losses by the insurer.34 Because of the variable pre-
mium mechanism, retrospectively rated plans present issues of risk
shifting and risk distribution that are similar to issues present in
the captive context.
Retroactive insurance is a less common device which also
30. See generally H. DENENBERG, R. EILERS, W. HOFFMAN, C. KLINE, J. MELONE &
W. SNIDER, RISK & INSURANCE 389-90 (1964) (explaining principles of retrospective rat-
ing); S.S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R. CLINE, PROPERTY & LIABILITY INSURANCE 662-63
(3d ed. 1982) (discussing principles of retrospective rating); C. KULP, CASUALTY INSUR-
ANCE 584-86 (1942) (discussing retrospective insurance as an incentive to increase indus-
trial safety when applied to worker compensation programs); J. MAGEE, PROPERTY INSUR-
ANCE 750-51 (3d ed. 1955) (ability to modify premium costs based on current loss
experience is the distinctive feature of retrospective rating); G. MICHELBACKER, CASUALTY
INSURANCE PRINCIPLES 243-45 (2d ed. 1942) (retrospective rating ideally suited to larger
risks when accident severity and frequency area reasonably predictable); A. MOWBRAY, R.
BLANCHARD & C. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE - ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 421-22 (6th ed. 1969) (arguing that retrospective rating is self-insurance within
limits); I. PFEFER & D. KLOCK, PERSPECTIVEs ON INSURANCE 339-40 (1974) (retrospec-
tive rating encourages loss prevention); R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES &
PRACTICES 478-82 (6th ed. 1976) (discussing different retrospective rating plans).
31. See generally Steere Tank Lines Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1978) (amount paid by corporate taxpayer to insurance company not a deductible business
expense where company was obligated to pay amount equal to the losses incurred); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 8637003 (May 23, 1986) (estimated premiums based on expected losses to be
incurred by taxpayers are not deductible); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8638003 (June 11, 1986)
(same).
32. See I.R.C. § 832 (Supp. V 1987).
33. See R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, supra note 30, at 378-81.
34. A discussion of the full range of potential tax problems facing a taxpayer using
such an arrangement is beyond the scope of this Article. The issues may generally be
stated as: (1) whether an arrangement calling for a premium which will roughly equal
losses plus loading charges, achieves sufficient risk shifting to be insurance, and (2)
whether an arrangement where premium obligations are contingent upon occurrence of
losses justifies a current accrual deduction, even if the arrangement constitutes insurance.
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places at issue the elements of insurance. This arrangement may
be used by a business seeking to cover uninsured losses resulting
from a disaster. It may also involve coverage of "incurred but not
reported losses" of a prior period. The most notable case of the
first type of such coverage occurred when MGM purchased retro-
active insurance after its hotel burned in 1980.35 This arrange-
ment illustrated a discontinuity in the tax law: since MGM was
contesting the amount of its liability arising from the fire, it could
not currently deduct any expense arising from this known loss,
even though its accountants would require MGM to take a signifi-
cant charge against current income for book purposes. MGM thus
sought to gain a current deduction for the premium expense, while
the insurance company offset the premium income with a deduc-
tion for losses incurred. 6
Each of these three types of programs (captive, retrospective,
and retroactive insurance) presents the issue of whether the ar-
rangement constitutes insurance. The government has been un-
receptive to taxpayers' arguments supporting a characterization of
the arrangements as insurance. In addition, the Internal Revenue
Service has indicated a willingness to challenge the deductibility
of premiums arising from retrospectively rated arrangements on
the basis that such an arrangement is not insurance. 17 These chal-
lenges have occurred from the perspective of the insured. The
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation also questioned the in-
surance status of retroactive insurance arrangements. 38 During the
hearings, which questioned retroactive arrangements, it was sug-
gested that Congress undertake to define insurance for purposes of
federal income taxation." A Congressional effort to define insur-
ance might occur if taxpayers were to prevail in any significant
controversy concerning the characterization of an arrangement as
35. See generally Aarsteinsen, MGM Charges Insurers with Breach of Contract, J.
Commerce, Mar. 15, 1983, at 7A, col. 4 (MGM sues retrospective insurance carrier for
refusing to pay for settled suits); Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at 16, col. 2 (same); McIn-
tyre, MGM Buys Back-Dated Cover, Bus. Ins., Feb. 9, 1981, at 1, col. 2 (back-dated liabil-
ity insurance policies issued to cover losses from a prior hotel fire).
36. See Smith & Witt, An Economic Analysis of Retroactive Liability Insurance, 52
J. RISK & INSURANCE 379 (1985).
37. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 8637003 (May 23, 1986); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8638003
(June 11, 1986).
38. See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., TAXA-
TION OF PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES 12 (Comm. Print 1983) [here-
inafter JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET].
39. Id. at 10-13.
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insurance.
B. The Significance of Insurance in Tax Law
In order to understand the conflict over purported insurance
arrangements, it is necessary to explain what makes insurance a
significant issue in tax law.
Of primary importance is the potential for tax reduction by
taxpayers. This possibility results from a combination of the in-
sured's assertion of a current deduction with respect to the pre-
mium paid to the captive, with the tax treatment conferred on
property and casualty insurance companies by subchapter L.
Before the subchapter L provisions were changed by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, an insurance company was permitted to offset
premium income with an undiscounted estimate of losses to be
paid in the future.40 This treatment did not take into account the
time value of money, which is inherent in an insurance company's
use of premium reserves, during the period between the collection
of premiums and their ultimate disbursement to pay claims. As a
result, insurers were willing to enter into "cash flow underwriting"
schemes which produced an initial underwriting loss for tax pur-
poses (thereby producing a tax benefit for the remainder of the
corporate group), with the expectation that this "loss" would be
offset by investment earnings (themselves often tax-free) in the
period before claims are paid. The qualification of such underwrit-
ing plans as "insurance" - at least under traditional rules - was
subject to question.
Although controversies are still pending under former provi-
sions of subchapter L, recent changes to these provisions apply
prospectively. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 required insurance
companies to discount their current deduction for losses incurred
in order to take into account the time value of money41 and lim-
ited the opportunity for tax-free investment. 42 Thus, the benefits
to insurers have now been trimmed, although insurance companies
are still subject to special rules in subchapter L which can give
40. See I.R.C. § 832 (Supp. V 1987); Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 252-53;
Greene, Tax Problems Relating to Captive Insurers, 18 FORUM 253 (1982-83) [hereinaf-
ter Greene, Tax Problems].
41. I.R.C. § 846 (Supp. V 1987).
42. It has also been noted that the 1984 amendments to I.R.C. Section 267 required
a captive insurer to include premium income in the same period as the insured claimed the
premium expense deduction. Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 451.
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insurance companies a tax advantage over non-insurance compa-
nies by allowing a current deduction in some amount.4
Other factors have also enhanced the importance of the insur-
ance characterization. Taxpayers likely to utilize the insurance ar-
rangements in question are often accrual-basis taxpayers. An ac-
crual-basis taxpayer has historically been able to take a deduction
for a liability once all events have occurred that determine the
fact of liability and the amount can be determined with reasona-
ble accuracy.44 Under a long established interpretation of the "all
events" test, taxpayers could not take a current accrual deduction
for self-insurance because an obligation to pay an insurance pre-
mium was necessary to establish a current deduction related to
the liabilities."5 However, by the late 1970's and early 1980's, tax-
payers were encouraged by an emerging line of cases that ap-
peared to be breaking down the old rule disallowing the current
deduction with respect to self-insurance.4 6 This temporarily took
the pressure off the definition of insurance.
The pressure returned with the advent of the "economic per-
formance" rules that were introduced with the Tax Reform Act of
1984. Contrary to the previously emerging trend, these rules en-
sure that self-insured taxpayers cannot take a current accrual de-
duction for estimates of liabilities to be paid in the future, even
though the liability itself might be conceded and its amount esti-
mated with reasonable accuracy. The deduction for such liabili-
ties, often arising from a tort or worker's compensation claim,
must now satisfy not only the two prongs of the old "all events"
test, but also the "economic performance" rules requiring pay-
ment to the claimant.47 The obligation to pay insurance premiums
43. See I.R.C. § 832 (Supp. V 1987). Professor Taylor believes that the 1984
amendments to I.R.C. section 267 and the requirement of discounting reserves under
I.R.C. Section 846 remove both the tax advantages for captive insurers and the potential
for abuse. Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 451. See also Bradley & Winslow,
supra note 3, at 254-57 (amendment of subchapter L to discount reserves would remove
much of the potential for abuse in captive arrangements).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1960).
45. See, e.g., Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930),
affg 13 B.T.A. 189 (1928).
46. The rule against the deduction for self-insurance reserves began to soften in the
mid-1970's and early 1980's when courts permitted deductions for the accrual of uncon-
tested, but unpaid, worker's compensation liabilities. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United
States, 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983); Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975). For a detailed discussion of these cases and the
economic performance rules, see Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3.
47. I.R.C. § 461(h) (Supp. V 1987).
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however, still gives rise to a current deduction because economic
performance is deemed to occur ratably over the course of the pol-
icy period,48 further demonstrating the importance that the trans-
action be classified as one of insurance from the side of the
insured.
The alternative minimum tax ("AMT") rules, which are part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are expected to create additional
interest in the characterization of insurance arrangements.49 The
AMT is based in part on the difference between tax and book
income. 50 Fifty percent of any excess of book income over alterna-
tive minimum taxable income constitutes a portion of the alterna-
tive minimum taxable income, and is taxed at a twenty percent
rate to the extent it exceeds the regular tax liability. This tax may
be applicable if a tax deduction is taken in years following the
year in which the deduction was taken for book purposes,51 such
that book income would exceed the relevant tax income figure.
For example, in the MGM situation described above, book
income would be reduced in the year of the fire, even though in
the absence of either insurance or an actual payment to a claim-
ant, there would be no corresponding tax deduction. The tax de-
duction would arise in a later year when the claim was settled.
Because there would be no charge against book income in that
year, book income could well exceed taxable income, thereby cre-
ating a "preference" for AMT purposes. Although it is possible to
get a tax credit when book income initially exceeds taxable in-
48. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 875 (1984).
49. See I.R.C. § 55 (Supp. V 1987).
50. See I.R.C. § 56 (Supp. V 1987).
51. Accountants generally do not count the premium payment to an affiliated insurer
as an expense. See ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 5, 27 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1982). Instead, accountants treat as
uninsured, risks covered by "insurance through a subsidiary or investee to the extent not
reinsured with an independent insurer." Id. This is supported by the statement that: "The
effects of transactions between a parent or other investor and a subsidiary or investee com-
pany shall be eliminated from an enterprise's financial statements." Id. (citation omitted).
In some circumstances, a payment to an unrelated insurance company may not result in a
recognized accounting deduction:
[T]o the extent that an insurance contract or reinsurance contract does not, de-
spite its form, provide for indemnification of the insured or the ceding company
by the insurer or reinsurance against loss or liability, the premium paid less the
amount of the premium to be retained by the insurer or reinsurer shall be ac-
counted for as a deposit by the insured or ceding company.
Id. at 44.
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come,52 there is no reason to believe that this transaction will later
cause such an inversion and the credit mechanism does not work
backwards to achieve this result. Thus, the new AMT provisions
provide an incentive to an insured to secure the insurance expense
deduction at the same time as the book expense is taken, espe-
cially if a major item is involved.
For these reasons, characterization as insurance for a number
of arrangements has taken on an increased significance. The im-
portance of the characterization extends beyond the captive insur-
ance context to that of other arrangements such as retrospective
and retroactive insurance. It would be desirable to develop some
rules to determine the existence of insurance in these arrange-
ments. The inquiry begins by reviewing the tax authorities rele-
vant to an analysis of the purported insurance arrangements.
II. TAX AUTHORITIES CONSIDERING THE DEFINITION OF
INSURANCE AND THE CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY CASES
A commentator on insurance has said that it is nearly impos-
sible to define insurance. 53 It has also been argued that it is un-
necessary to do so since the correct results can be achieved on a
case by case basis. 54 These general observations suggest that it
will be difficult to extract anything of use on the captive insurance
issue and other tax issues from the general definition of insurance.
Moreover, the commentators imply that tax authorities, purport-
ing to base their decisions on a definition of insurance, may be
influenced by factors other than pure insurance theory or
economics.
These observations can be confirmed by an examination of
the authorities. The historical definitions of insurance that can be
gleaned from the tax authorities in existence over a decade ago
are of limited assistance. The courts and the parties have contin-
ued to struggle with the early definitions primarily in the context
of captive cases.
52. See I.R.C. § 53 (Supp. V 1987).
53. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 2 (1971). For an indication of
the difficulty inherent in this process as shown by an exhaustive attempt to collect the
divergent definitions that have been proposed for the concept of insurance, see H.
Denenberg, What Constitutes Insurance Within the Meaning of the Law (1965) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis available from University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan)
[hereinafter Denenberg Manuscript].
54. See Lenrow, Cuddy & Shuster, Should Congress Define Insurance for Tax Pur-
poses?, BEsT's REVIEW, LIFE/HEALTH, Mar. 1985 at 112, 120.
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A. Tax Authorities Antedating the Captive Cases
The early tax authorities, starting with the Internal Revenue
Code and the Treasury Regulations, provide nothing more than
broad, and typically unhelpful, generalities when defining insur-
ance. Neither "insurance" nor "insurance company" is specifically
defined by the Code, despite the great importance of such terms in
determining the tax consequences to insurance companies and in-
sureds.5 The Treasury Regulations give only a somewhat circular
definition of "insurance company." 56 The regulations state that a
company will be an "insurance company" only if its "predominant
business activity" is the writing of "insurance" contracts.51 Other-
wise it will not be treated as an insurance company.5"
55. See JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note 38, at 11.
56. The regulations state that:
The term "insurance company" means a company whose primary and predomi-
nant business activity during the taxable year is the issuing of insurance or an-
nuity contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies.
Thus, though its name, charter powers, and subjection to State insurance laws
are significant in determining the business which a company is authorized and
intends to carry on, it is the character of the business actually done in the taxa-
ble year which determines whether a company is taxable as an insurance com-
pany under the Internal Revenue Code.
Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (1960). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.831-3(a) (1963) (defining the
insurance companies to be taxed under § 831 as "only those companies which qualify...
under . . . paragraph (b) of § 1.801-1 and which are subject to the tax imposed by §
831."); Rev. Rul. 71-404, 1971-2 C.B. 260 ("[A] title guaranty corporation . . . whose
primary and predominant business activity during the taxable year is . . . the issuance of
title insurance policies on real property . . . is an insurance company as defined in section
1.801-3(a)(1) of the regulations taxable under section 831(a) of the Code.").
57. For example, in Estate of Clarence L. Moyer, 32 T.C. 515 (1959), a stock ex-
change established and operated a "Gratuity Fund" that paid death benefits to heirs of
members. Payments were made upon admission to membership and those amounts together
with a portion of the profits from the exchange financed the Gratuity Fund. The Tax Court
held the Fund to be a separate entity from the exchange for tax purposes, and concluded
that the Fund was an insurance company because its only activity was providing death
benefits to members of the exchange. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950) (gratuity fund is insurance
where termination of membership results in forfeiture of all rights to death benefits), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950); Estate of William E. Edmonds, 16 T.C. 110 (1951) (payment
from gratuity fund constitutes insurance due to presence of risk shifting). See also Haynes
v. United States, 353 U.S. 81 (1957) (employer's private program of health and accident
coverage was "insurance").
58. For example, in Inter-American Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
497 (1971), affd, 469 F.2d 697 (1972), and Cardinal Life Insurance Co. v. United States,
300 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Tex. 1969), revd on other grounds, 425 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir.
1970), entities claiming to be life insurance companies were denied that status because
they did not aggressively seek insurance business, they had no active sales staffs, and their
investment incomes greatly exceeded their incomes from premiums earned.
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The Treasury Regulations show that the concept of "insur-
ance" activity is relevant to insureds and insurers in different
ways. For the insurer, it means that the entity must be primarily
engaged in the writing of insurance contracts to be an "insurance
company." For insureds, it means that the particular contract in
question must possess the characteristics of insurance in order for
the expense to be deductible as a premium expense." The insured
faces the issue with respect to the individual contract in question,
while the insurer faces the question with respect to the aggregate
of its contracts after the "insurance" content of each individual
contract has been determined.
The elements of such "insurance" activity were broadly de-
fined in the case law long ago. "Insurance" is generally thought to
consist of risk shifting and risk distribution. The seminal tax case
which expressed these requirements was Helvering v. Le Gierse.0
Subsequent authorities have generally accepted these elements as
determinative of the presence of insurance,6' but the predominant
59. Even if a payment is made for something other than insurance, it may still be
deductible as a section 162 business expense, unless it falls within the ambit of section 263.
The argument was made long ago in support of the deductions for premiums paid to cap-
tives, that the deduction should be allowed as an ordinary and necessary business expense
whether or not it is for "insurance" so long as the amount is determinable with reasonable
accuracy. Sachs, supra note 3, at 58-59. The captive cases have, however, denied the de-
ductions upon a finding that the payments were not for insurance. See, e.g., Humana Inc.
v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 207 (1987) (no premium deduction allowed unless risk
shifting and risk distribution are present), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247
(6th Cir. 1989); Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 960 (1985), afid,
811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987) (payments made to wholly owned captive insurance com-
pany not deductible where there is no accompanying shift of loss). The Tax Court in
Humana held that "in disallowing the payments as insurance premiums, we reclassified
them as nondeductible." Humana Inc., 88 T.C. at 207. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the Tax Court on this issue, holding that payments by Humana to its wholly
owned subsidiary did not constitute premiums because the risk of loss remained solely with
the parent corporation. Humana Inc., 881 F.2d 247.
60. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
61. Two authors once suggested that United States v. Consumer Life Insurance Co.,
430 U.S. 725 (1977), stands for the proposition that risk shifting is not necessary for there
to be "insurance" for federal income tax purposes. See Curley & Wawro, To What Extent
Does Deductibility of Insurance Premiums Depend Upon Risk-Shifting?, 53 J. TAX'N. 116
(1980). Consumer Life has been described as a case "in which the Supreme Court found
that, although there was no significant risk shifting, a transaction was valid reinsurance."
JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note 38, at 14. It is an open question as to whether
the Supreme Court intended to endorse such a broad proposition. In any event, that asser-
tion has been thoroughly undercut as a general interpretation of Consumer Life's effect on
the definition of insurance by the growing number of captive insurance company cases
decided in the last eight years, as well as other Supreme Court authority on the meaning of
insurance. See, e.g., Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir.
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focus in such authorities has been on the risk shifting component.
In Le Gierse, an 80-year-old woman purchased both an annu-
ity contract and a single premium life insurance contract from a
commercial insurance company. The risks to the insurance com-
pany under the two contracts - longevity under the annuity con-
tract and early death under the insurance contract - neutralized
each other. Moreover, the contracts could not be purchased sepa-
rately and the premiums were calculated so that the insurer had
no risk of loss. The Supreme Court held that the "insurance" pol-
icy did not constitute "life insurance," the proceeds of which at
that time could have been received tax-free.62 Accordingly, the
proceeds from the policy were subject to estate tax, since the in-
surer had assumed no risk other than an investment risk depen-
dent upon the time of payment."3
1985) (no insurance resulted from captive arrangement in Stearns-Roger and Consumer
Life "does not lead to a different result").
One further point on Consumer Life merits note. This Article concludes that the cap-
tive cases should focus on tax avoidance reasoning rather than risk shifting analysis and the
definition of insurance. In that regard, Consumer Life has been criticized as an illustration
of "what seems to be an increasing tendency of the courts to refuse to inquire deeply into
problems of statutory interpretation except when faced with a plainly tax motivated event."
Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REv. 733, 757 (1978) [hereinafter Gunn, Tax Avoid-
ance]. The majority's only answer to the assertion that the statute did not warrant this
result was that "state regulation would prevent 'overreaching' and that the reinsurance
agreements served a business purpose." Id. at 758. I do not suggest that Consumer Life
was correct in allegedly ignoring a statutory requirement. But Professor Gunn's view ap-
pears to suggest that an enhanced scrutiny for risk shifting in the captive context is occa-
sioned by a suspicion of tax avoidance. If that is the case, it is even more evident that the
decisions should be grounded on tax avoidance principles rather than on a variable notion
of risk shifting. Professor Gunn might suggest that a neutral definition of risk shifting
should be used. This Article suggests that such a neutral definition would not allow the
courts to challenge the taxpayer's position in all cases, and if such a broad challenge is
intended, the courts should admit that they are using tax avoidance principles.
62. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 537 (1941).
63. The Court stated that:
Considered together, the contracts wholly fail to spell out any element of insur-
ance risk. It is true that the "insurance" contract looks like an insurance policy,
contains all the usual provisions of one, and could have been assigned or surren-
dered without the annuity.
Certainly the mere presence of the customary provisions does not create
risk, and the fact that the policy could have been assigned is immaterial since,
no matter who held the policy and the annuity, the two contracts, relating to the
life of the one to whom they were originally issued still counteracted each other
Here the total consideration was prepaid and exceeded the face value of the
"insurance" policy. The excess financed loading the other incidental charges.
Any risk that the prepayment would earn less than the amount paid to respon-
dent as an annuity was an investment risk similar to the risk assumed by a bank;
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The courts have followed this analysis and found the absence
of insurance where the company in question did not assume an
underwriting or economic risk. 4 In addition, the risk must be sub-
stantial. For example, the insured purporting to cover a body of
risks must utilize a contract that shifts to the insurer a risk of loss
greater than the insolvency of the insured. 5 Thus, such cases can
be summarized as supporting the principle that the risk of loss
transferred must be one of possible economic loss, significant in
relation to the purported coverage, and beyond the control of the
insured.66
Notwithstanding occasional elaboration on particular facts,
the basic elements of the definition of insurance set forth in Le
Gierse continue to be the cornerstone of insurance-definition anal-
ysis. Because the policy in that case was found not to constitute
insurance even though it was issued by a fully regulated commer-
cial insurer, it shows that the definition is one of substance, not
form. Le Gierse does not provide a complete definition however,
because the Court did not elaborate upon the concepts of risk
shifting and risk distribution. Its decision turned upon the absence
it was not an insurance risk.
Id. at 541-42. In the companion case of Estate of Keller, 312 U.S. 543, 545 (1941), the
Court emphasized that a "risk" based upon the prevailing interest rates which does not
profitably cover the obligated annuity is not a risk in the sense necessary to constitute
insurance. See also Kess v. United States, 451 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1971) (a combined life-
annuity contract carries only investment, not insurance, risks); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 102 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1939) (contract representing an investment with a
provision for a return of premiums does not present the essential requisite risk shifting of
insurance); Rev. Rul. 77-129, 1977-1 C.B. 189 (interest credited to a deposit fund does not
involve the risk shifting element of insurance and hence is not tax deductible); Rev. Rul.
75-255, 1975-2 C.B. 22 (annual payments to the beneficiary of a Life Annuity and Death
Benefit contract do not involve the risk shifting of insurance); Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 C.B.
56 (life insurance contract which could not have been acquired except in combination with
a life annuity contract does not manifest the risk shifting of insurance).
64. Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978) (guaran-
teeing the presence of criminally accused persons by a bail bond company was not an
insurance risk), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978); Cuesta Title Guaranty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 278 (1978), aff'd mem., 639 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1981) (obligation to make
payments with respect to taxpayer's own negligence is not an insurance risk, as it fails to
establish that the insurer bears the risk of the insured's loss).
65. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978) (ad-
justable premium contract which purported to cover a body of risks generally, but which
only shifted the risk of insolvency, is not insurance), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979).
66. But cf. Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-06-001 (Mar. 11, 1983) (surety contracts written by
mutual insurance company may constitute insurance contracts). It has also been suggested
that Consumer Life, supra note 61, stands for the proposition that an insolvency risk is
sufficient. See Lenrow & Milo, The Continuing Dialogue of When Is Insurance Not Insur-
ance, BEST'S REVIEW, PROPERTY/CASUALTY Nov. 1978 at 58.
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of risk shifting. The Le Gierse Court left the definition of risk
distribution unclear. Moreover, it was not clear whether risk dis-
tribution is a condition that must be satisfied in order for a given
contract to qualify as insurance.
The term risk distribution is difficult to define because most
tax authorities deal with it in the same conclusory manner as the
Le Gierse Court. In one revenue ruling, a taxpayer purchased con-
tracts similar to those in Le Gierse, with the annuity premium
being equal to the face value of the insurance contract. 8 The Ser-
vice held that the contracts were not "insurance" because "the
insurance company has not undertaken to shift the risk of prema-
ture death from the insured and to distribute the risk among its
policyholders. On the contrary, by requiring the purchase of a
non-refund annuity contract the company has eliminated this
risk."'69 From this description, a risk may be understood to be
shifted, if it is assumed by the insurer and the insured is relieved
from the potential financial loss.70 This has been termed the "ver-
tical approach" to risk transfer.7' The requirement that the in-
surer "distribute the risk among its policyholders" is not clear on
the face of authorities, such as this revenue ruling, because two
sufficient reasons are given for the absence of insurance and only
one is fully developed. Despite these observations, a general defini-
tion of risk distribution can be stated.
In simple contexts such as those in Le Gierse and the revenue
ruling, if there is risk distribution, the incidence of any given loss
may fall on those other insureds not suffering a loss. This occurs
through their payment of premiums and the fact that they suf-
fered no covered loss. Under this view of the insurance function,
distribution can be seen as a form of shifting, as those risks that
67. See generally I. PFEFFER, INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 19-23, 46-49, 53
(1956) (insurer may rely on pooling or other means to perform risk distribution); A. WIL-
LETT, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 72 (Columbia University Press
1901), reprinted, (S.S. Huebner, Foundation for Insurance Education 1951) ("Where there
is accumulation for uncertain losses, or whenever there is a transfer of risk, there is one
element of insurance; only where these are joined with the combination of risks in a group
is the insurance complete."); O'Brien & Tung, supra note 3, at 677-78 (citing many writ-
ers on insurance theory who regard risk distribution as a necessary element of the definition
of insurance).
68. Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-I C.B. 56.
69. Id.
70. See Bradley & Taten, When Will Premiums Paid to Captive Insurers Be De-
ductible?, 68 J. TAX'N 296, 297 (1988).
71. Id.
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have been "shifted" to the insurer or common fund "vertically"
are in turn "distributed" in a "horizontal" manner among the
other insureds.72 This is a fair characterization of how some of the
early leading cases defining insurance, such as Commissioner v.
Treganowan,7 3 describe the distribution process. It is sometimes
said that this risk distribution concept focuses on the broad social
aspect of insurance as spreading the cost of a loss throughout the
members of a group.7 4
However, it is not clear that this "shifting" to the other in-
sureds is a required part of the insurance process or its sub-part,
risk distribution. Other early tax authorities implicitly contradict
the interpretation of risk distribution as a horizontal form of shift-
ing, but without clearly establishing the bounds of any
disagreement.
This implicit contradiction occurred in United States v.
Weber Paper Co.,7  a case decided by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In that case, a reciprocal or inter-insurance exchange for
coverage of flood loss 76 was held to operate as a legitimate insurer
of flood risks. This result was reached even though all subscribers
were located in the same flood plain, so that if one suffered a loss,
72. Cf. Bradley & Taten, supra note 70, at 297 (transfer and distribution of risks
may be accomplished by pooling or distribution - termed the "horizontal approach" to
insurance). A more complete discussion of this asserted "horizontal approach" follows. See
infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
73. 183 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1950) (involving a stock exchange gratuity fund simi-
lar to that in Moyer), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950). In Treganowan, the court stated
that: "this plan provides a distribution of the risk, for because of the plan the risk of pre-
mature death is borne by the 1373 other members of the exchange, rather than by the
individual." 183 F.2d at 291. See also Ross v. Odom, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968) (Death
benefits are considered insurance when risk distribution and risk insurance are present in a
binding arrangement. "This involves the payment of premiums . . . by a number of indi-
viduals into a common fund" out of which the benefit is paid.); Pickering v. Alyea-Nichols
Co., 21 F.2d 501, 508 (7th Cir. 1927) ("[T]he basis of all insurance ... is to distribute
among the many the burden of losses accruing to the few."), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 617
(1928).
74. See Note, The New York Stock Exchange Gratuity Fund: Insurance That Isn't
Insurance, 59 YALE L.J. 780 (1950) ([hereinafter YALE Note].
75. 320 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1963), nonacq, 1964-1 C.B. pt. 1, 85, aff'g 204 F. Supp.
394 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
76. In Weber Paper, a subscriber paid a designated premium each year, and as the
premium payments increased, the amount of coverage for each subscriber increased. As a
result the exchange's reserves had to equal the face amount of insurance in force. The risks
were not reinsured. In addition, the balance in the subscriber's account, in this case 99
percent, could be withdrawn upon 60 days notice effective after the end of a policy year. In
the event of loss, all subscribers' accounts would be charged on a pro rata basis. Id. at 201-
04.
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all would probably suffer a similar loss, rendering payment on ac-
count of such losses a simple return of subscribers' premiums.
Such a possibility should call into question the presence of risk
shifting and risk distribution." The Service had earlier challenged
such an arrangement essentially on that basis in Revenue Ruling
60-275.8
The District Court in Weber Paper expressly rejected the
Commissioner's "no risk shifting" argument by emphasizing the
transfer of the premiums to a separate entity where the taxpayer
could not withdraw them at will, and stated that risk shifting was
not negated by the probable occurrence of one major event affect-
ing all insureds.79 Consequently, the amounts paid by the sub-
scribers were held to be currently deductible as premiums.80 In
fact, theoretical risk shifting and risk distribution were present by
the arrangements with numerous insureds, but the other facts in
the Weber Paper case relating to the undercapitalization of the
exchange and the non-independence of the covered risks belie the
existence of these insurance elements.
The failure of subsequent cases to clarify the principles used
77. Even though the distributions were to be "pro rata" from the funds held by the
exchange, the payment on account of major losses occurring at the same time would mean
that each subscriber would get back funds equal to the premium paid. In light of these
facts, the Service took the position that "the taxpayer . . . did not, as a practical matter,
lose control of its premium deposits, and . . . it was using [the exchange] as convenient
depository for a contingency reserve, instead of retaining the amount of the reserve in the
subscriber's own bank account or on its books." Id. at 204. The Service therefore argued
that there was no shifting of the risk of loss from the insured.
78. Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2 C.B. 43.
79. Weber Paper Co., 204 F. Supp. at 400. The court rejected the Service's argu-
ments by stating that they were:
based on the erroneous or irrelevant assumptions that there could be no real
sharing of the risks because the occurrence of a major flood "probably would
affect all properties in a particular flood basin"; that each subscriber is substan-
tially underinsured; and the non-sequitur that any proceeds received by the tax-
payer in the event of flood damage would, therefore, in effect, be a return of the
taxpayer's own money. Such conclusions are also inapplicable to the case at bar
since they ignore the fact that the deposits pass from the control of the taxpayer,
and that no portion thereof can be withdrawn by the taxpayer during the policy
year in which they are paid.
Id.
80. After the Weber Paper decision, the Service issued a further ruling adhering to
its original position. Rev. Rul. 64-72, 1964-1 C.B. pt. 1, 85. While the government has
continued to assail the result in Weber Paper, the courts in subsequent cases have looked to
it for guidance on the definitional issues concerning risk shifting and risk distribution. See,
e.g., Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984), aff'd, 774
F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985).
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in Weber Paper left the definitional issues confused.8 Although
the focus in Weber Paper was on risk shifting, which is under-
standable since the purported insurer did not have the financial
capacity to bear a risk other than by returning an amount approx-
imately equal to the amount paid as premiums, 2 the facts also
implicated the risk distribution concept. Later cases have ac-
knowledged that the court in Weber Paper found both shifting
and distribution present.83 The presence of a number of insureds is
generally seen as aiding in the insurance characterization.8 4 It is
not clear from the facts as described in Weber Paper exaictly how
this factor should be considered to have some significance, since
the decision might be interpreted as holding that the probabilities
that the risks of a given insured will in fact be distributed (or
shifted in the horizontal aspect of insurance) to another insured is
not relevant.8 5
These observations illustrate the ambiguities in the early
cases and rulings that existed as the modern insurance products,
such as captives and retrospectively rated plans, gained popularity
and headed toward litigation over their insurance characteriza-
tion. The vague definition of insurance for tax purposes left the
81. Revenue Ruling 60-275 and Weber Paper are representative of authorities that
present issues very similar to those found in captive insurance cases. To a large extent, the
Service's position in the captive insurance area grew out of 60-275. See Greene, Tax
Problems, supra note 40, at 257.
82. As a general matter, the concept of insurance requires that the actuarial bases of
the program must be sound. See Ross v. Odom, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968) (private
death benefit plan for state employees was "insurance" where based upon sound actuarial
principles); Davis v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.W. Va. 1971) (no "insurance"
when judges' retirement plan not actuarially sound). It seems that the exchange in Weber
Paper had the financial strength to pay the losses covered, but there was a relatively close
correlation between the premiums paid and the likely loss payments.
83. See Steere Tank Lines v. United States, 577 F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979). In Steere Tank Lines the Fifth Circuit noted
that "[in Weber, a subscriber's premium payment would be used to pay flood losses suf-
fered by other subscribers. Thus, there was an element of risk shifting to the insurer, which
in turn distributed that risk of loss among all subscribers." Id.
84. See, e.g., Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo.
1984). See also Steere Tank Lines, 577 F.2d at 280 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (no risk
distribution present where there was only one insured).
85. The distribution is sometimes said, as in Steere Tank Lines and Stearns-Roger,
to have taken place among the insureds. The Service found this theory inaccurate, unless
one accepted the view that in the event of a major loss, each insured got part of his own
contribution back and part of every other insured's contribution, although every insured
only would receive approximately what it contributed. Also, it was theoretically possible
that this major loss in the flood basin was not the only potential loss. See Rev. Rul. 60-275,
1960-2 C.B. 43.
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tax law ill-equipped to deal with modern insurance products.
While these early authorities are of modest assistance in establish-
ing some basic principles in this area, they do not resolve the fun-
damental issues.
B. A Review of the Captive Insurance Company Authorities
The development of the tax authorities dealing with captive
insurance companies further reveals the uncertainty in the tax
law's view of insurance principles. The Service and the courts
have struggled with the captive arrangement for over a decade.
The definitional issues present with a captive arrangement
can be seen most clearly in the context of a basic example. With a
single captive insuring only the risks of its parent, there is the
basic question of whether the insured has accomplished a transfer
of risks by contracting with an affiliate, and also whether other
insureds are necessary for there to be risk distribution. The same
issues are present in somewhat diluted form when the captive in-
sures risks outside of its affiliated group or is owned in part by
interests outside that group.86 For that reason, the development of
authorities began with the more basic arrangement given in the
example above, and a detailed examination should also start from
that point.
1. Single-Parent Captive With No Unrelated Business
Just over a decade ago, the Service addressed these issues and
86. For a retrospectively rated plan, there is the similar question of whether risk
shifting occurs despite the variation of the premium to correspond with losses paid plus
loading charges. Also, there is an issue of whether risk distribution is absent, since the
variation of the premium means that the insured in question is unlikely to leave any funds
"in the pot" for the other insureds. For the insured, these are questions relating to whether
its contract is one of insurance, thereby affecting its ability to claim a deduction. See gen-
erally Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54 ("[W]hen there is no economic shift or distri-
bution of the risk 'insured,' the contract is not one of insurance and the premiums therefor
[sic] are not deductible under section 1.162-1(a) of the regulations."). To be an insurer
entitled to the tax benefits of subchapter L, a company must be predominantly engaged in
issuing contracts effecting insurance. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.801-3(a)(1) (1960), 1.831-3(a)
(1963). The current focus on the insureds and their individual contracts can logically be
extended to an analysis of the aggregate activity of an insurer. If that extension is followed,
there is the question of whether the elements of shifting and distribution must also be
present when one studies the position of the insurer.
Because the various cash flow plans share many common issues, a study of the devel-
oping captive insurance cases sheds light not only on that area, but also on the definitions
of property and casualty insurance for tax purposes.
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found neither risk shifting nor risk distribution in a single parent
captive arrangement where the captive insured only its corporate
affiliates.8 7 Revenue Ruling 77-316,88 denied the deductibility of
premium payments made to a wholly owned foreign captive insur-
ance company by the parent corporation and its other subsidiar-
ies.89 The general reasoning of the ruling was that the corpora-
tions participating in the arrangement "though separate entities,
represent one economic family with the result that those who bear
the ultimate economic burden of loss are the same persons who
suffer the loss.' ' 9° Examining the "economic reality" of the trans-
actions in this manner, the Service concluded that the arrange-
ment lacked risk shifting and risk distribution and was, therefore,
not insurance. The Service purported not to disregard the separate
corporations but merely to disregard the transaction between
them.
For about a decade, the Service enjoyed virtually unbroken
success in establishing this result in the courts.91 The early cases
involved relatively weak arrangements, such as inadequately capi-
talized captives, which had insufficient funds to pay for the ex-
pected losses of the insureds and therefore could not effect a trans-
fer of risk.92 In some of these cases the precise reason for the
Service's victory was not clear. A narrow reason relating to the
87. The history related in this Article begins with the position taken in the published
rulings of the Service. For a detailed history of the early development of this position
within the Service, as indicated by unpublished memoranda, see Bradley & Winslow, supra
note 3, at 234-38.
88. 1977-2 C.B. 53.
89. Some details of the ruling will not be fully discussed as they are not necessary for
the present discussion. First, the ruling purported to deal only with foreign captives, but its
reasoning has been held to apply equally to captives organized under the laws of a state.
See, e.g., Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984), affid,
774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985). Second, the ruling considered examples of direct insurance
with a captive and the use of reinsurance. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54. The cases
have not given any significant weight to the different fact patterns when the risks purport-
edly lie with the captive.
90. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54 (emphasis added).
91. The one captive case in which the government did not prevail was Crawford
Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985), a case involving such an
unusual fact pattern that it is of little use in analyzing the arrangements discussed as single
parent captives. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 240 n.79.
92. See Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978), affid, 640 F.2d 1010
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States,
577 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985); Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9803 (D. Kan. 1984), aij'd, 797
F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986).
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capitalization was stated in some opinions.93 Other opinions ap-
peared to accept Revenue Ruling 77-316 at least implicitly. 4
In general, a predominant group of cases95 comes very close
to adopting the Service's position that affiliated corporations can-
not shift risks among themselves because they are in the same
"economic family."9 In any event, these cases essentially use an
economic reality or consolidated financial statement accounting
analysis of the transaction to make their determination. Yet no
opinion has explicitly endorsed the "economic family" theory of
Revenue Ruling 77-316.11
The recent opinion by the Ninth Circuit in Clougherty Pack-
ing Co. v. Commissioner,98 improved on the articulation of the
earlier revenue ruling's position with a "net worth" approach. 9
The court asserted that the parent of a captive has no change in
net worth when it "insures" with a subsidiary because a loss paid
by the subsidiary reduces the net worth of the parent through the
decrease in value of its stock in the subsidiary, as if the parent
paid the loss itself. From that observation, the court concluded
that no risk was shifted and the arrangement was not insurance.
Moreover, the court concluded that this analysis did not disregard
93. See, e.g., Carnation Co., 71 T.C. 400. The Tax Court's decision in Carnation
largely turned upon the financial inability of the captive to bear the risks covered, and the
parent's agreement to provide capital to the captive. Similar issues relating to capitaliza-
tion agreements and inadequate capitalization of the captive were present but ignored by
the courts in Stearns-Roger and Beech Aircraft.
94. Carnation Co., 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1980) (agreeing with Tax Court
that risk was neutralized by offsetting agreements and noting that one fact pattern in Reve-
nue Ruling 77-316 is identical to Carnation while rejecting Carnation's argument that this
ruling fails to recognize the separate status of corporations); Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United
States, 577 F. Supp. 833, 836-38 (D. Colo. 1984) (citing Ninth Circuit decision in Carna-
tion, noting the Court's heavy reliance on Revenue Ruling 77-316 and applying an "eco-
nomic family" analysis); see also Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297,
1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) (Carnation "explicitly refers to the Ruling" and both the ruling
and Carnation "reach the correct result").
95. Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F.2d 1297; Carnation Co., 640 F.2d 1010; Stearns-
Roger Corp., 577 F. Supp. 833; Beech Aircraft Corp., 1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1
9803 (D. Kan. 1984), afid, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986).
96. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54.
97. 1977-2 C.B. 53. See Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 449 ("No court
...has expressly embraced IRS 'economic family' theory."); cf. Abramowitz & Allen,
Rev. Rul. 88-72 v. Gulf Oil - The Tax Court Should Reaffirm that Unrelated Risks Can
Make a Difference, 43 TAx NOTES 325, 326 n.10 (1989) (several courts "either expressly
adopted the [economic family] theory or applied a similar economic analysis").
98. 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
99. This rationale has been called a variation of the economic family approach.
Barker, supra note 3, at 284-86.
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the separateness of the corporations since it looked merely to the
parent's worth.' 00
Some of the opinions in the captive cases go beyond the Ser-
vice's position containing arguments with anti-tax avoidance over-
tones. References have been made to the "loophole" nature of the
arrangement.' 0 ' Statements that tax law preferred substance over
form,102 thus borrowing from general tax principles, have also
been made. 03 Yet these anti-tax avoidance arguments were not
fully developed or explained.
A second group of cases, which are primarily from the Tax
Court, rely on what appears to be a more ad hoc approach, often
disclaiming reliance upon the "economic family" concept. 04 The
Tax Court began in 1985, with Clougherty Packing Co. v. Com-
missioner,05 to develop this different approach. The court ex-
pressly rejected the economic family theory because of the court's
belief that reducing a captive insurance transaction to economic
reality would disregard the separateness of corporate entities gen-
erally required under the Supreme Court's decision in Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner.'"6 Nevertheless, the Tax Court
100. Clougherty Packing Co. v. United States, 811 F.2d 1297, 1305-07 (9th Cir.
1987), affg 84 T.C. 948 (1985).
101. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9803,
85,404 (D. Kan. 1984), affd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986).
102. Beech Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d at 922.
103. See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-470 (1935) (corporation
technically qualified as reorganized but was held to not be truly reorganized under the
intent of the statute); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1192
(5th Cir. 1970) (tax consequences must turn upon the economic substance of a transaction
and not upon the time sequences or form of the transaction."), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939
(1971); Barnett v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1966) (deduction not allowed on
transaction in which taxpayer could not have realized profit and "transaction had no pur-
pose, utility or substance apart from the tax consequences"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005
(1967).
104. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987); Humana Inc. v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), ajf'd in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir.
1989); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985); Clougherty Packing Co. v.
United States, 84 T.C. 948 (1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987). The Mobil Oil
opinion also has overtones of form over substance and economic reality, but it ultimately
turns to the language in the Tax Court's Clougherty Packing decision, with the effect that
the disallowance of the deduction is a recharacterization of the transaction. Mobil Oil, 8
Cl. Ct. at 567.
105. 84 T.C. 948 (1985), aJFd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). The Clougherty Packing majority disclaimed reliance on
the "economic family" concept because "it might foster a theory which would be extended
to other areas of tax law," Clougherty Packing, 84 T.C. at 959, and "such a concept
cannot be reconciled with types of transactions between related eoities other than insur-
ance [transactions]." Id. at 957. This meant that the "economic family" concept was per-
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disallowed the taxpayer's deduction. The result was reached by a
recharacterization process in which the court purported to con-
sider all the facts and circumstances in determining whether the
arrangements constituted insurance. The court reasoned that obli-
gations would not constitute insurance premiums unless the con-
tract transferred the risk from the taxpayer to another. 107 The
court concluded that the single parent captive did not accomplish
that result. The premium payments were used only to pay the
losses of affiliates and they were held to be the same as a nonde-
ductible reserve for losses.108 The majority reached this result over
a strong dissent arguing that the majority had in fact, if not in
word, adopted the Service's economic family concept.109
The Tax Court has subsequently adhered to and expanded
upon this approach. In two subsequent cases, Humana Inc. v.
Commissioner' ° and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,"" the Tax
Court has reaffirmed the recharacterization analysis without spec-
ifying any facts which are relevant to the recharacterization of the
premium obligations as nondeductible items, other than the own-
ership of the captive.
The Tax Court's decision in Humana is particularly notable
for showing the flexibility of this approach with brother-sister cor-
porations. The Tax Court in Humana held that its analysis per-
mitted a denial of a premium expense deduction by a subsidiary
corporation that contracted for insurance with another subsidiary
corporation of its (the insured's) corporate group. This fact pat-
tern can be contrasted with the simpler situation where the parent
insures with its subsidiary. It was this factual twist in Humana,
involving insurance between brother-sister corporations, that later
convinced the Sixth Circuit to reverse that part of the Tax Court's
decision which denied the deduction for premium expenses be-
tween brother-sister corporations because the net worth of those
corporations could be affected by the purchase of insurance. 2
ceived to conflict with the Moline Properties rule that under the tax law, separate corpora-
tions are respected in their dealings with each other as separate legal entities.
107. Clougherty Packing, 84 T.C. at 958.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 967-68.
110. 88 T.C. 197 (1987), affid in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir.
1989).
Ill. 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).
112. The Sixth Circuit held that parent corporations cannot deduct premiums paid
to wholly owned subsidiaries, but that the subsidiaries are entitled to tax deductions for
premiums paid to the captive. The Humana court stated that it was adopting the net worth
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Gulf Oil involves the simpler parent-subsidiary situation in a
case in which the court still denied the deduction. Gulf Oil is the
first opinion in which a reader finds language that expresses an
attitude not entirely hostile toward some captive variations while
still containing overtones of substance over form. Speaking for the
majority, Judge Whitaker opined that "[a]lthough technically,
transfer of risk may occur when a captive is involved that is a
separate, viable entity, financially capable of meeting its obliga-
tions, we simply decline to recognize it as such when the arrange-
ment is merely, in substance, the equivalent of a reserve for losses
or self-insurance."" 3 Moreover, Gulf Oil is most significant for
the dicta, discussed in the next section, further indicating a mod-
erate approach, apparently acceptable to a Tax Court majority,
with respect to captive cases that may be applicable beyond the
single parent/single insured situation, such as the variations to
which we now turn.
2. Single-Parent Captive With Unrelated Business
Authorities regarding the tax treatment of premiums to be
paid to a captive that writes significant insurance coverage outside
its affiliated group are just now beginning to develop. The pres-
ence of such outside business had long been thought by taxpayers
and their counsel to possibly distinguish some captives from those
in the litigated cases referred to above. In general, the view was
that substantial unrelated business would increase the likelihood
that the risk shifting aspect of the transaction would be
respected." 4
The case law has been slow in developing. 1 5 In the early
analysis of the Ninth Circuit in Clougherty Packing, 881 F.2d at 252, which is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 98-100. In doing so, the court stated that "[u]nder no circum-
stances do we adopt the economic family argument advanced by the government." 881
F.2d at 257.
113. Gulf Oil Corp., 89 T.C. at 1024.
114. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 242-43. See also, Abramowitz &
Allen, supra note 97, 328, 333 (arguing for a wider acceptance of Gulf Oil's upholding of
premium deductions when there are unrelated risks based on a definition of insurance);
Adler, Sears Sues to Retain Premium Deduction, Bus. Ins., Mar. 13, 1989, at 2, col. 3
(Service uses economic family argument to challenge a captive arrangement where almost
all of captive's businesses are unrelated).
115. For a detailed history of the development of an unpublished line of authority
within the Service which suggested that the Service might respect the captive arrangement
if the unrelated business was substantial (fifty percent of premiums or more), see Bradley
& Winslow, supra note 3, at 237 n.69. The Service later repudiated this position as it
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1980's, observers hoped that the issue would be addressed in Mo-
bil Oil Corp. v. United States,"" a case then being tried in the
Claims Court on several issues including one involving a captive
insurance company which wrote approximately fifty percent of its
business outside the affiliated group."' The Claims Court denied
the premium expense deductions based on the prior case law, with
some reliance on the Tax Court's opinion in Clougherty Pack-
ing."' The Mobil Oil opinion generally disappointed the observers
by its failure to explain why the presence of unrelated business did
not affect the outcome of the case. Because the facts recited in the
opinion reveal an awareness of the unrelated business of the cap-
tive and the briefs in the case specifically address the issue, the
Claims Court's opinion has been viewed as holding that unrelated
business is irrelevant to the captive issue and does not aid the tax-
payer in achieving risk shifting." 9 The unrelated business issue
appeared to be dying, if not dead.
Such a conclusion though, was apparently premature. In the
Tax Court's previous captive opinions, the unrelated business issue
was reserved, 120 but few expected much to result from it after Mo-
bil Oil. The court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,'21 dropped
a bombshell when it announced in dicta that a significant amount
of unrelated business would result in an insurance characteriza-
tion of the transaction and a deduction for the premium expense.
The court reasoned that such a situation could effect risk shifting
because the premiums of the unrelated insureds might be used to
pay the losses of the affiliated insureds. 22 Under this view, the
conflicted with the government's position in Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555
(1985).
116. 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985).
117. Id. at 562.
118. Id. at 566-68.
119. See Barker, supra note 3, at 310; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 243-44.
120. Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 215-16 (1987) (Whitaker, J., con-
curring), affid in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989); Clougherty Packing
Co. v. United States, 84 T.C. 948, 960 (1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
121. 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).
122. The Gulf Oil court stated that:
If all of the insureds are related, the insurance is merely self-insurance be-
cause the group's premium pool is used only to cover the group's losses. By ad-
ding unrelated insureds, the pool, from which losses are paid no longer, is made
up of only the affiliated group's premiums. When a sufficient proportion of pre-
miums paid by unrelated parties is added, the premiums of the affiliated group
will no longer cover anticipated losses of all of the insureds; the members of the
affiliated group must necessarily anticipate relying on the premiums of the unre-
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risks would be shifted horizontally, through the presence of nu-
merous insureds, rather than vertically, through a contract with a
separate unrelated insurer."' 3
The Service reacted swiftly to this novel approach to insur-
ance theory. In Revenue Ruling 88-72,124 the Service asserted its
view that the parent's ownership of the captive prevents the exis-
tence of an insurance arrangement between the two entities, re-
gardless of the underwriting by the captive of a substantial
amount of unrelated business. Using a net worth analysis similar
to that used by the Ninth Circuit in Clougherty Packing, the Ser-
vice reasoned that the parent has not relieved itself of the risk
since it will still bear the economic consequences of any loss
through its ownership interest in the captive. 12 5
The unrelated business issue appears to be the new battle-
ground concerning captives. The Service's denial of a premium ex-
pense deduction will be based on its use of the net worth theory.
The net worth theory would deny an insurance characterization
whether or not the captive insures unrelated risks, while providing
a rationale that allows the Service to claim that it is looking at
economic reality in such transactions and still respecting the sepa-
rate corporate existence of both the parent and the subsidiary.
3. Captives With Multiple Owners and Insureds - The Group
or Industry Captive
Throughout the controversy and debate over the types of cap-
tive arrangements discussed above, it has been assumed that a
group or industry captive presented an arrangement justifying a
deduction. A group captive is an insurance corporation organized
lated insureds in the event that they are "the unfortunate few" and suffer more
than their proportionate share of the anticipated losses.
Thus, when the aggregate premiums paid by the captive's affiliated group is
insufficient in a substantial amount to pay the aggregate anticipated losses of the
entire group, the affiliates and unrelated parties, the premiums paid by the affili-
ated group should be deductible as insurance premiums and should no longer be
characterized as payments to a reserve from which to pay losses. Risk distribu-
tion and risk transfer would be present, and the arrangement is no longer in
substance equated with self-insurance.
Id. at 1026-27 (citations omitted).
123. The description of this view as "horizontal" risk shifting, and the contrast of it
to the typical "vertical" risk shifting, was first made by Bradley & Taten, supra note 70, at
297.
124. 1988-2 C.B. 31, clarified in, Rev. Rul. 89-61, 1989-3 I.R.B. 4.
125. Id. at 32-33.
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to cover a number of parties operating in one particular industry,
and is thus subjected to similar risks. Such a captive is owned by
numerous corporations which then insure with it.
The published authority is generally favorable to taxpayers in
this context. Over a decade ago, the Service issued Revenue Rul-
ing 78-338,126 which found risk shifting and risk distribution,
hence insurance, in such an arrangement involving thirty-one
owner-insureds. One of the few cases decided in favor of the tax-
payers, Crawford Fitting Co. v. United States, 27 has been charac-
terized as a group captive case.2" In Crawford Fitting, the captive
was owned by the 100% shareholder of the insuring taxpayer, in-
dividuals who had business relationships with the taxpayer, and
several corporations which were partially owned by the 100%
shareholder of the taxpayer.129 The court found that this pattern
of ownership meant that the captive and the taxpayer-insured
were not so economically related that their financial transactions
should be aggregated as in Revenue Ruling 77-316, in which the
Service advanced its economic family theory, Is3 and the premium
expenses were therefore held to be deductible.
The apparent acceptance by the authorities of group captives
should not be interpreted as the final word on this issue. From the
standpoint of economic reality, risk has not been shifted because
the insured still owns a part of the insurer.'3 ' This observation
may lead the government to disallow a portion of such premium
expense deductions "to the extent of the percentage ownership of
the insurer by the insured.' ' 2 While this net worth analysis may
be at odds with the Service's current guidance on the issue, Reve-
nue Ruling 78-338,'133 it is consistent with the direction that some
of the cases have taken. Thus, at some point even the group cap-
126. 1978-2 C.B. 107.
127. 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
128. See Barker, supra note 3, at 302-04. Another case, Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9803 (D. Kan. 1984), affid, 797 F.2d 920
(10th Cir. 1986), involved an insignificant amount of outside ownership and the court did
not treat it as a material fact.
129. Crawford Fitting Co., 606 F. Supp. at 137-38.
130. 1977-2 C.B. 53.
131. Barker, supra note 3, at 306.
132. Id. at 307.
133. 1978-2 C.B. 107. See also Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 450 (The
"IRS' literal net worth approach [requiring] each partial owner . . . experience a partial
disallowance of its premium deduction . . . . although dictated by the 'economic family'
theory, is at odds with IRS' current position reflected in Revenue Ruling 78-338 and Reve-
nue Ruling 80-120." (footnotes omitted)).
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tive may come under attack by the Service.
4. Summary of Development of the Case Law
The Service has been remarkably successful in disallowing
deductions for premiums to be paid to captive insurance compa-
nies. While no court expressly accepted the Service's "economic
family" theory, they have shown no reluctance to use a net
worth analysis or recharacterization approach in order to deny
such deductions when a wholly owned captive with no unrelated
business is involved.
The recent reversal of the Tax Court in Humana on the issue
of premium expense deductions between sister corporations and
captives and the Tax Court's dicta regarding the significance of
unrelated business in its Gulf Oil opinion, indicates that the situa-
tion is not stable.'1 5 As cases involving factual variations are en-
tering the litigation process, dissenting voices to the wholesale dis-
allowance of premium expense deductions are being heard. In
addition, the government's argument has been refined to focus on
the net worth variant of the economic family concept. The prior
cases disallowing the deduction had rested on an absence of risk
shifting, and typically eschewed an analysis of risk distribution as
unnecessary to their decisions."3 6 The renewed debate similarly fo-
cuses on the risk shifting element.
With the issues now fully developed it is possible to subject
the captive arrangements to more exacting scrutiny. In particular,
it is possible to examine in greater detail the problems with resolv-
ing the captive issue based on a definition of insurance, especially
one that depends on the existence of risk shifting.
III. THE CAPTIVE INSURANCE DILEMMA - PROBLEMS WITH
APPLYING A RISK SHIFTING ANALYSIS
For over a decade, the courts have faced one of the basic is-
sues relating to captive insurance: the insured's ability to deduct
134. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97. In fact, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals has expressly rejected the "economic family" theory in Humana Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 881 F.2d 247, 256-57 (6th Cir. 1989), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 88 T.C. 197
(1987).
135. See Humana Inc., 881 F.2d 247; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner 89 T.C. 1010
(1987).
136. See, e.g., Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 449 (Tax Court's ap-
proach is to find the absence of risk transfer and not answer the risk distribution question).
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the premium expense.137 An uninitiated observer might wonder
why the issue is still so troublesome after so much exposure. A
principal reason is that the issues in conflict were not fully de-
bated until the advent of the more recent decisions. With the im-
pressive number of authorities mounting in opposition to the basic
single parent captive arrangement, an observer could have con-
cluded that the captive issue was decided. But those authorities
consisted of cases with less challenging fact patterns and opinions
authored by judges who perceived no merit in the taxpayers'
position.
This situation first began to change as the Tax Court became
more active in the captive cases. The recent decisions from that
court, which still deny the deduction on the facts before them,
contain factual variations of captive arrangements. These varia-
tions include coverage by the captive of the risks of unaffiliated
corporations and brother-sister corporations, rather than simply
the risks of the parent.'38 The variations have caused a simmering
dispute between the majority and a significant number of dissent-
ing judges, to heat to the boiling point. This has resulted in swing
vote judges producing a new majority on the Tax Court. This
change has made possible the development of a different majority
position on the issues, including the suggestion that not all deduc-
tions for premium expenses paid by an affiliate to a captive will be
disallowed. This change is also present outside the Tax Court, as
evidenced by the Sixth Circuit's reversal in Humana, which re-
sulted in the first major victory for the taxpayers in its allowance
of a deduction for a premium expense paid to a brother-sister
corporation.
This struggle to develop a coherent theory capable of respect-
ing some captive arrangements has focused on the definition of
insurance. In that process, the courts have grappled with some of
the basic elements of insurance.
Another reason for the lengthy debate over the captive insur-
ance issue is the failure of the opponents to join issue with each
other. The strong words used by the Tax Court judges in their
137. The first case to address this issue was Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
400 (1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). The
courts have not faced the issue of the status of the insurer as an insurance company enti-
tled to the tax benefits of subchapter L. This has been recommended as the means of
attacking captives rather than by challenge of the insured's premium deduction. See Tay-
lor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 452.
138. See Gulf Oil, 89 T.C. 1010; Humana Inc., 88 T.C. 197.
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bitter exchanges indicates that the basic captive issue cuts to core
concepts in tax law. Judges upholding the government's character-
ization of the transaction have been criticized for failing to ex-
plain "how it is able to disregard the transactions in the [basic
single parent captive] case without crashing head on into the hold-
ing of Moline Properties,"'13 9 which is generally understood to per-
mit affiliated corporations to deal with each other as separate le-
gal entities. This criticism has been rebutted with the position that
a captive arrangement in economic reality amounts to self-insur-
ance, which does not produce a current deduction. In effect, the
two sides are talking past each other. As a result, the opinions
have pursued some questionable analyses that could have been
avoided if both sides would characterize the issue as the tolerated
level of tax avoidance, which is both the cause of the conflict and
the subject of these cases.
A. Risk Shifting Analysis Produces a Difficult Conflict
Between Competing Tax Doctrines
The roots of the conflict in risk shifting analysis lie in two
competing lines of tax cases which deal broadly with uses and lim-
its of anti-tax avoidance doctrines.140 The source of the conflict
suggests that its resolution lies not with the definition of insur-
ance, but with the policies behind general tax doctrines, such as
protection of federal tax revenues, 141 promotion of certainty in tax
planning, 4  and encouragement of legitimate business transac-
tions. 43 Because the conflict involves fundamental principles, it al-
lows for no precise or uncontroversial resolution.
The two lines of cases essentially represent opposite conclu-
sions reached in anti-tax avoidance cases. The first of these lines
of cases is grounded in the general principle of substance over
139. Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 967 (1985) (Gerber, J.,
dissenting), affd, 811 F.2d 1297 (1987).
140. Classification of doctrines in this area is itself somewhat problematic as the
doctrines are interrelated. See generally Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Con-
struction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693 (1978) (discussing two lines of
cases, one favoring substance, the other favoring form); Rice, Judicial Techniques in Com-
bating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1953) (same).
141. The "justification for preventing tax avoidance is rational and legitimate: the
need for protection of the federal revenues by preservation of public confidence in our sys-
tem of taxation." Rice, supra note 140, at 1051.
142. See Underwood, Form and Substance in Tax Cases, 16 VA. L. REv. 327, 341-
42 (1930).
143. See Rice, supra note 140, at 1023.
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form. These cases stand for the proposition that economic reality
governs when evaluating the effect of transactions; therefore
transactions without a business or non-tax purpose will not be
respected as to its form. Such cases include Gregory v. Helver-
ing'44 and Knetsch v. United States.45 The cases recognizing eco-
nomic reality can be joined with those disallowing an accrual de-
duction for self-insurance, typified by cases such as Spring
Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner,'46 and perhaps supported by
those disallowing the use of reserve accounting to estimate items
of income to be received or paid in the future.1 47 The second line
of cases has its roots in form, specifically the special recognition
given to the corporate form under Moline Properties, Inc. v. Com-
missioner.41 Moline is understood to mean that separate corpo-
rate entities, including a parent corporation and its subsidiaries,
are normally respected as separate entities. 49
The two lines of cases converge in the captive context. If eco-
nomic reality controls, the captive arrangements are self-insur-
ance. In contrast, if form prevails the transactions are insurance
because they purport to be between two legally separate
entities.50
144. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
145. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
146. 13 B.T.A. 189 (1928), af'd, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
654 (1931).
147. See generally Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (cash received as
advances for dance lessons to be rendered in a subsequent year is not tax deferrable);
American Automobile Association v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) (Automobile As-
sociation's prepaid membership dues are not tax deferrable and must be included in the
Association's gross income for the year in which the dues were received); Automobile Club
of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) (Commissioner did not abuse discre-
tion in refusing to accept an accrual basis accounting method for repaying membership
dues).
148. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
149. See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
150. One commentator has stated that these two lines of cases were considered two
of the more certain concepts among many vague tax avoidance doctrines. Rice, supra note
140, at 1052. Professor Rice stated that:
Without attempting an exhaustive assembly of the cases, it is clear that [predict-
able] principles include such major doctrines as those establishing that realloca-
tion of income within a family group will not shift the incidence of income tax
liability, nor will transactions which do not vary the actual command of income
or the property taxed. Similarly, in reorganization cases the decisions require a
continuity of interest, while profits are said to carry over in cases of merger and
liquidation but deficits do not. In still another field, decisions respecting the cir-
cumstances under which a corporate entity will be disregarded have created a
reasonably stable and dependable body of principles.
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1. The Economic Reality Line of Cases
Examination of the conflict begins with the economic reality
or substance over form cases. Considered under those cases, cap-
tives can be taken as an alternative form of risk management
designed to obtain a current accrual deduction denied the self-
insurers. It has been suggested that the use of captives grew from
the early defeats of the self-insurers. 5' In overall economic effect,
captives circumvent Spring Canyon Coal, since the arrangement
is essentially identical to self-insurance if the finances of all the
affiliates are considered.
The tax law sanctions the use of economic reality to prevent
tax avoidance if a transaction has no economic substance other
than a tax deduction. Using this type of analysis, the Supreme
Court in Knetsch v. United States'52 disallowed a deduction for
interest paid for the purchase of bonds, when the bonds yielded
less than the interest on the loan to buy them.15 3 Knetsch is re-
garded as one of the leading cases in this economic reality line.'15
Id. (footnotes omitted).
151. Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 216 n.1 (1987) (Whitaker, J., con-
curring), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989); Bradley & Wins-
low, supra note 3, at 233.
152. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
153. This resembles the Court's analysis in Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531
(1941) where the offsetting of aspects of a single transaction which neutralizes the eco-
nomic effect of a part of the transaction were considered a means of tax avoidance. See
supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
154. See Bittker, supra note 140, at 715-16. As related by Professor Bittker, this line
of cases, derived from Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), was described by
Learned Hand as follows:
The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering . . . means that in construing [the]
words of a tax statute which describe[s] commercial or industrial transaction[s]
.we are to understand them to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial
or industrial purposes and not to include transactions entered upon for no other
motive but to escape taxation.
Bittker, supra note 140, at 715 (quoting Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal
Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950)).
The Knetsch decision:
denied an interest deduction for loans of this type on the ground that the trans-
action itself was a sham, without explicitly employing the business purpose doc-
trine, but some decisions on identical transactions relied primarily on Gregory in
reaching the same result, and these opinions were cited with apparent approval
by the Supreme Court in Knetsch. Another formulation is that such a transac-
tion lacks economic reality; in effect, it is all form and no substance.
Id. In Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1005 (1967), the Second Circuit generalized the "business purpose" requirement to extend
to personal activities when it denied the interest deduction "because the loan did not have
'purpose, substance, or utility apart from [its] anticipated tax consequences.'" Bittker,
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Cases in the economic reality line should be interpreted to-
gether with cases like Spring Canyon Coal, for the proposition
that schemes which in substance constitute self-insurance will not
give rise to a current deduction. Proponents of the economic real-
ity line of cases would say that in substance, the affiliated group
using a captive insurer is self-insured. The affiliated group is try-
ing to use form to achieve by an indirect means that which it
could not do directly."'
2. The Form Over Substance Line of Cases
The substance over form analysis merely sets up the conflict
with the other line of cases represented by Moline Properties.5 6 A
natural extension of the principle of respecting the separate corpo-
rate form when there is a valid business purpose, is that separately
incorporated entities can engage in transactions with affiliates as
long as those transactions have a business purpose other than the
avoidance of taxes.117 The purchase and sale of insurance is a nor-
supra note 140, at 716. The court in defining its "purposive activity" requirement ex-
plained that the interest deduction would not be permitted:
[W]hen it objectively appears that a taxpayer has borrowed funds in order to
engage in a transaction that has no substance or purpose aside from the tax-
payer's desire to obtain the tax benefit of an interest deduction: and a good ex-
ample of such purposeless activity is the borrowing of funds at 4% in order to
purchase property that returns less than 2% and holds out no prospect of appre-
ciation sufficient to counter the unfavorable interest rate differential.
Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 741-42.
155. For statements to this effect by courts considering captive cases, see, e.g., Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir. 1986); Stearns-Roger Corp.
v. United States, 774 F.2d 414, 416-17 (10th Cir. 1985).
156. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
157. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 1.05 (5th ed. 1987) ("a transaction is not given effect for tax pur-
poses unless it serves some purpose other than tax avoidance"). For works focusing on the
requirement of business purpose, see Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the
Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TUL. L. REV. 355 (1963); Summers, A
Critique of the Business-Purpose Doctrine, 41 OR. L. REV. 38 (1961); Note, The Business
Purpose Doctrine: The Effect of Motive on Federal Income Tax Liability, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1078 (1981) [hereinafter BUSINESS PURPOSE Note].
Bittker and Eustice state that:
In addition to possible application of the statutory provisions and principles
, transactions between affiliated corporations may fail to accomplish their
tax expectations because of numerous other income, deduction, timing, and char-
acterization rules .
It has long been the rule that transactions lacking in economic substance or
reality will be disregarded for tax purposes. The fountainhead of this approach
is, of course, the renowned case of Gregory v. Helvering, but other equally well-
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mal business transaction taking place between two separate par-
ties. Because the terms of the contract can specify the shifting of
risk, one cannot simply analyze the arrangement by its terms to
be self-insurance without the transaction or one of the parties be-
ing disregarded. The carrying of insurance risks is a business that
a subsidiary can conduct apart from its parent. Thus, in order to
regard the liabilities assumed by a separately incorporated captive
as self-insured, one must conclude that the liabilities stay with the
insured affiliate corporation. This means that the location of the
liabilities (under the contract) with the captive, is not respected in
form. Thus, calling a captive insurance arrangement self-insur-
ance on the grounds of economic reality conflicts with Moline
Properties.158
known applications can be found in the Higgins, Griffiths, Knetsch decisions.
These general principles and attitudes, sounding in tax avoidance, business pur-
pose, and form versus substance, have been applied in a number of cases involv-
ing sales of property between related corporations at a loss ...
[With respect to deductions claimed on a transaction between affiliates,]
[t]he fact that the parties are related, although not fatal, nevertheless imposes
upon them a practical duty that they "turn square corners" in their dealings
with each other, lest the transaction fail to satisfy [the] basic statutory require-
ments [such as those under Code section 162] and presuppositions of
deductibility.
B. BITrKER & J. EusTiCE, supra, at T 15.04, 15-30 - 15-36 (citing and describing Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (loss sale to wholly owned corporation disregarded as
sham); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939) (purported installment sale through
a wholly owned corporate conduit disregarded as sham); Knetsch v. United States, 364
U.S. 361 (1961) (borrowing transaction disregarded as a sham); Goldstein v. Commis-
sioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (no economic profit potential apart from tax savings),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967)).
In contrast, Professor Gunn has stated that the "business-purpose doctrine is sensible
to the extent that it means, as it seems to have meant in Gregory, that corporations must
actually carry on business activities to be recognized as corporations under the reorganiza-
tion provisions." Gunn, Tax Avoidance, supra note 61, at 738-39. This view of the busi-
ness-purpose doctrine would apparently prevent it from imposing any nonstatutory require-
ments for commercial transactions, a more limited role than that normally assigned to it by
scholars and courts, who "feel comfortable imposing a 'business purpose' requirement as an
adjunct to almost any kind of transaction." Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Mea-
surement, 87 MICH. L. REv. 365, 396 & n.88 (1988).
158. Bittker and Eustice's description of the holdings in the captive cases illustrates
how the authorities purport to avoid this conflict. They cite "the various captive insurance
subsidiary cases, where separate entities are respected, but deduction is denied for pur-
ported premiums because arrangement is not insurance (no risk shifting or distribution, but
only the economic equivalent of a self-insurance reserve)." B. BITTKER & J. EusTCE, supra
note 157, at 5 15-37 n.102. This Article contests the non-insurance characterization if the
separateness of the entities is indeed respected.
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3. Traditional Tax Analysis: Failure of the Business Purpose
Standard
Conflicts between form and substance in transactions between
affiliated corporations have traditionally been resolved in a man-
ner that does not overemphasize either alternative. Transactions
between affiliates have been disregarded on occasion, but not by
simply looking to the economic reality that all the affiliates are in
the same corporate group. No transaction between affiliates would
survive application of that standard. Traditional tax analysis could
collapse an insurance transaction if one could conclude that the
captive is a sham corporation with no business purpose and there-
fore its existence can be disregarded. Instead of automatically
treating the captive as a sham with no valid business purpose, the
transaction between the affiliated corporations might also lack a
business purpose (i.e., non-tax reason) and can be disregarded
under established principles of tax analysis. 159
The failure of the government or the courts to analyze cap-
tive arrangements under the business purpose standard d6 0 suggests
159. The requirement of business purpose has long occupied a "valid and important
role in [the] tax system." Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69
HARV. L. REV. 985, 995 (1956). See Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income
Taxation, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 485 (1967) (role of motive in determining whether taxpayer
had a valid business purpose). In addition, it has been observed that:
it is hard to see how an Internal Revenue Code can be successfully applied in the
modern world without the safeguards afforded by the Gregory doctrine and its
various facets. It is a technique of statutory interpretation difficult to apply but
essential to our tax system as it now operates.
2 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 678
(2d ed. 1980). See also Rice, supra note 140, at 1038 (application of the doctrine justified
on the basis that no tax avoidance plan was established).
160. An example of the failure to analyze captive arrangements under the business
purpose doctrine is found in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States: "in matters of taxation,
form must give way to substance . . . and the economic reality of the business arrange-
ment rather than the outward form of a transaction will determine its tax consequences."
797 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)). A
statement that form prevails over substance is too broad and therefore devoid of analysis.
Appeals to form or substance with lack of analysis seem to be, as Learned Hand stated,
"vague alternatives . . . anodynes for the pains of reasoning." Commissioner v. Sansome,
60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1932).
The business purpose doctrine has also been criticized. See Summers, supra note 157,
at 42; BUSINESS PURPOSE Note, supra note 157, at 1095. This Article however, is intended
to show that the analysis of captive arrangements is driven to the use of the business pur-
pose doctrine, and attempts to apply it in a principled and nonconclusory manner.
In discussing the application of the business purpose doctrine as a result of the deci-
sion in Gregory, the Supreme Court has taken a narrower approach than that urged by the
government:
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that the captive cases present an arrangement that the courts can-
not handle under this analysis. It has been noted that the business
purpose cases present "hard cases," '161 and captive arrangements
only magnify the degree of difficulty. This is because as applied to
the captive arrangement, the business purpose test produces circu-
lar reasoning. In addition, once beyond the circularity problem,
one may not be satisfied to reconcile the lines of cases represented
by Knetsch and Moline Properties merely by asking whether there
was a lack of business purpose.16 2 Instead, a more difficult choice
The Government urges that the principle underlying Gregory v. Helvering
finds expression in the rule calling for a realistic approach to tax situations. As
so broad and unchallenged a principle furnishes only a general direction, it is of
little value in the solution of tax problems. If, on the other hand, the Gregory
case is viewed as a precedent for the disregard of a transfer of assets without a
business purpose but solely to reduce tax liability, it gives support to the natural
conclusion that transactions, which do not vary control or change the flow of
economic benefits, are to be dismissed from consideration.
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940). The taxpayer in Smith sold property to a
corporation which he controlled merely to claim a tax loss. Disallowance based on Gregory
should not be surprising in this case. The acquisition of insurance, however, can be under-
taken to effect compliance with state laws or fulfill business obligations, such that it is
difficult to say that the purchase of coverage from a regulated insurance company lacks
business purpose because the insurer is a captive. Moreover, the broad "substance over
form" statement is belied by numerous cases discussed infra which give regard to transac-
tions between affiliates.
161. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 159, at 675-76.
The authors describe Gregory as constituting a "printed warning, 'Beware - Proceed with
Caution', that faces tax reduction plans having any element of artificiality or non-conform-
ance with normal business or family conduct." Id. at 672-73. They further describe why
these are hard cases:
[I]f the correct underpinning is present (i.e., the taxpayer cuts [no] legal corners
and is [not] careless about the substance of each independent step) the problem
is a difficult one. After all, a taxpayer may buy a tax-exempt security in a situa-
tion where the transaction makes economic sense only because of the interest
exemption . . . . Thus, in some areas the Code provisions themselves are under-
stood to establish new business norms though those norms are motivated by the
tax result. But other provisions, such as the interest deduction . . . must be un-
derstood as written only for those transactions whose business or economic norm
or motivation is not derived from the tax law.
Id. at 675-76. See Rice, supra note 140, at 1038 ("The existence of a calculated plan to
avoid taxes is the basic explanation for all of the cases concerning the effect of transactions
which are commercially unfamiliar and comply with formal requirements for minimizing
taxes under the statutes.").
162. The business purpose doctrine is often described as denying expected tax bene-
fits with respect to a transaction with no business purpose. See Rosenberg, supra note 157,
at 389-400. For an application of this definition to a captive case, see Humana Inc. v.
Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247, 255 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Absent a fact pattern of sham or lack
of business purpose, a court should accept transactions between related though separate
corporations as proper ... ")
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between the two is required in order to solve this dilemma.
In order to illustrate the problem, consider an example of the
circular lines of thought to which this area lends itself: if the sub-
sidiary is organized to carry on an insurance business, it is not a
sham and should be respected. As a separate entity it can make
an insurance contract to bear the risk of another corporation, in-
cluding an affiliate, because the making of an insurance contract
has a business purpose if it contains standard risk shifting terms.
But if the arrangement were to be considered as a whole, includ-
ing the affiliated relationship of the contracting parties, there is no
business purpose. The separate corporation and the "insurance"
transaction need not be respected by the government.
The exquisite torture of such ideas may in practice be re-
lieved in favor of the taxpayer's position, because of the typical
presence of some colorable 6 3 business purpose.16 4 The captive
usually performs functions that would give it a business purpose
independent of its assumption of the risks of an affiliate, such as
loss prevention, investment management, and insurance of unre-
lated parties.165 Indeed one of the reasons for the organization of a
captive by a medical services provider, such as Humana Inc., was
the advantageous treatment for Medicare reimbursement purposes
that captives bring to its affiliates over self-insurance.166 This sort
of business purpose might break this circle.
However, it may simply pose a tougher issue regarding the
anti-tax avoidance analysis required to break the circularity of
reasoning. As a general proposition, it is difficult to conceive of
decisions made only for tax reasons. Generally decisions have at
163. It has been observed by some that one of the difficulties with the business pur-
pose test is the ability of the taxpayer to assert a business purpose to suit the occasion. See
Rice, supra note 140, at 1044; Summers, supra note 157, at 41.
164. It has been said that some of these conceptualizations may appear to be "mere
semantic gamesmanship" but that "[s]tarting points are important." Therefore, the tax-
payer's focus on the legitimate nature of the insurance company is misplaced, because the
issue is whether risk has been shifted from the insured to the insurer. Barker, supra note 3,
at 298-99. While this may be the issue, once the captive is considered a separate legal
entity, it becomes difficult to see the lack of business purpose.
165. See Greene, Tax Problems, supra note 40, at 253 (a captive can serve to pro-
vide direct access to reinsurance markets and make a profit by offering insurance coverage
to third-parties); Greene, Captives: The Long Swim Back and Other Opportunities, 20
FORUM 627 (1985) [hereinafter Greene, Captives] (tax law changes and their impact on
captive insurance companies).
166. See Brief of Petitioner-Taxpayer at 11-12, Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88
T.C. 197 (1987) (Nos. 15292-80, 17130-82), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 881 F.2d 241
(6th Cir. 1989).
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least some business purpose. 1 7 Captives may then provide a situa-
tion where the question that must be answered is whether an as-
serted business purpose can be disregarded where it is not of suffi-
cient weight in relation to the tax avoidance potential of the
transaction in question.
4. Weighing Business Purpose Against the Potential for Tax
Avoidance
The nature of this dilemma suggests that the issue requires a
value judgment be made by weighing the sufficiency of a business
purpose against the transaction's tax avoidance potential. Often,
such a decision cannot be fully articulated or rationalized." 8 The
government's position, in relying upon Spring Canyon Coal
through the use of arguments such as the economic family con-
cept, is that substance or economic reality controls over form.'69
The taxpayers argue that form controls, as the tax law generally
recognizes transactions between separate corporate entities, with
certain exceptions noted in the above discussion of the business
purpose test, none of which the government seems to apply either
directly or expressly.' 70 There are no other points in the analysis
on which the two different lines of reasoning can be reconciled.
The issue thus becomes a choice between two themes in tax law.
The choice will ultimately depend on which theme is deemed to be
more important in preserving the integrity of the tax system. The
theme chosen at this juncture could control the results in almost
all of the captive cases: if an economic reality approach is used,
captives cannot insure affiliates,'1 ' and if the Moline Properties
concept is followed, all captives can insure anyone, affiliates and
nonaffiliates.
A leading commentator suggests that utilizing anti-tax avoid-
ance analysis is merely an attempt to avoid a difficult question by
167. See Gunn, supra note 61, at 738 n.20.
168. See Rice, supra note 140, at 1051 ("The major premises under which tax
avoidance is frustrated in some cases and allowed in others are simply too ephemeral to be
articulated."). See also Bittker, supra note 140, at 695 (Judicial criteria like "form," "sub-
stance," "business purpose," and "economic reality," "are more successful in establishing
an attitude or mood than in supplying crisp answers to specific questions.").
169. See Barker, supra note 3, at 299.
170. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 246-49; O'Brien & Tung, supra note
3, at 669-70; Sachs, supra note 3, at 59-61; Tinsley, supra note 9, at 149-50; FORDHAM
Note, supra note 6, at 819.
171. This would extend at least to the single parent captive arrangements.
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using a vague or broad doctrine. Assertions of tax avoidance may
be overused "to avoid grappling with complex problems. 11 2 The
business purpose doctrine may also be a "doctrine of last resort,
invoked only where no more concrete and measurable principle is
available to lend respectability to the decision of the court.11 37
However, this Article does not adopt a course based simply on its
ease.
Commentators criticizing broad anti-tax avoidance analysis
sometimes assert that the cases can easily be explained on other
grounds.17 4 The same commentators may recognize the merit of
turning to an examination of motives in close cases, or as a last
resort.717 By first analyzing the definition of insurance, this Article
seeks to show that captive insurance is a subject fit for anti-tax
avoidance reasoning.
B. The Conflict Cannot Be Avoided By Use of the Risk
Shifting Element of the Definition of Insurance
Attempts to avoid the conflict between tax doctrines by defin-
ing insurance are unavailing. The matter has been exacerbated
because the government, and some courts reaching the result ad-
vocated by the government, apparently see no conflict between the
two doctrines in the captive arrangement.
Perhaps the strongest explanation for the failure to perceive
this conflict is the "net worth" variation in the economic family
concept.17 6 This attempt to avoid a conflict with Moline Proper-
172. Gunn, Tax Avoidance, supra note 61, at 755-56.
173. Rice, supra note 140, at 1044. See R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES
661 (lst ed. 1954) (purpose is generally irrelevant "except as motive may throw light upon
equivocal conduct").
174. See, e.g., Gunn, Tax Avoidance, supra note 61, at 750. Professor Gunn offers
the Goldstein case as an example that he characterizes as capable of resolution without
reference to the anti-tax avoidance analysis because the payment pattern in Goldstein did
not match that of a typical debt transaction involving interest payments. In that case, the
"unusual" pattern for the borrowing was only a prepayment of interest, which is not very
remarkable by itself. Professor Gunn notes that the borrowing was intimately tied to the
purchase of the Treasury notes that yielded a lower rate of interest than the borrowing, and
thus the borrowing should not be considered separately from the purchase of notes. Id. at
750-54.
The reason for defining a term so creatively stems from the lack of a business purpose.
Otherwise, it is difficult to see why a given transaction should be recharacterized beyond its
form. Thus, the suggestion of defining such terms does not appear to advance the analysis.
175. Gunn, Tax Avoidance, supra note 61, at 748-49; Rice, supra note 140, at 1044.
176. See Barker, supra note 3, at 284-86 (net worth idea is variation of economic
family concept). The government usually offers expert evidence supporting the net worth
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ties seems to be enjoying an upsurge in popularity. It represents a
creative, but not fully satisfying use of the definition of insurance.
1. The Use of a Net Worth Test to Reconcile Moline
Properties and the Economic Reality Concept
The best articulation of the net worth approach and its as-
serted consistency with Moline Properties lies in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Clougherty Packing.1 7 To paraphrase the court,
no conflict exists if one defines insurance as a device to remove the
economic consequences of risk from an entity. That transfer of
risk is not present in the captive cases because the parent owns the
captive and its net worth is diminished dollar for dollar by any
losses paid by the captive. This does not disregard the captive as a
separate entity because the approach only requires the analysis of
the parent's financial statements." 8 At first blush, this sounds like
a complete answer to the taxpayer's arguments about Moline
Properties.
It is worth noting at the outset that the insurance literature
did not appear to require the net worth explanation of insurance
prior to the litigation of the captive cases. Insurance scholars ap-
parently accepted the legal conclusion that affiliated corporations
could insure with each other since they were considered separate
legal entities.'7 9 Indeed, the government's expert witness once ad-
idea. However, it does not appear as a part of the Service's published ruling. See Rev. Rul.
77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53. The explanation of the economic family approach appeared at
least several years earlier. See O'Brien & Tung, supra note 3, at 683-85.
177. 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), affg 84 T.C. 948 (1985).
178. Id. at 1305.
179. See Goshay, supra note 4, at 115 ("separate tax entity of the captive insurer
would seem justifiable as long as" operated as a separate company). Goshay and others
writing in the insurance and economics area have been cited as concluding that captives
constitute self-insurance. See also Barker, supra note 3, at 271 n.12, 272, 283 n.63 (citing
Goshay and authorities discussed below). That conclusion is not stated in the authorities
cited. Goshay actually said that "it might be argued that captive insuring is the epitome of
the self-insurance device." Goshay, supra note 4, at 80 (emphasis added). In addition,
Goshay stated that captive arrangements have elements of both insurance and self-insur-
ance. Id. at 85.
Similarly, other authors writing on insurance theory similarly do not equate captive
arrangements with self-insurance. Professor Friedman does not mention the captive con-
cept. M. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 80 (1976); FRIEDMAN & SAVAGE, The Utility Analysis
of Choices Involving Risk, in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 57-96 (1952). Neither does
Professor Pfeffer, who discussed self-insurance at length. I. PFEFFER, supra note 67, at 47,
52-53. If Professor Pfeffer had concluded that captives cannot offer insurance to affiliates
that would be remarkable since he testified as an expert witness for the taxpayer in
Humana. Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 209 (1987), affid in part and rev'd
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mitted that the government's economic family concept depends on
an assumption of "piercing of the corporate veil."'1 80 This conclu-
sion is further supported by the inability of the courts in foreign
countries to disallow the deductions on the basis of the definition
of insurance.181 Nevertheless, the net worth theory can be refuted
with more precision.
2. Criticism of the Net Worth Approach
The basic premise of this theory should first be scrutinized
from the standpoint of finance authorities. The theory may falter
at a very early and general stage, as authorities from the finance
area generally do not advocate the proposition that the value of an
enterprise moves dollar-for-dollar in the direction of the value of
its assets.8 2 The value of a captive should turn as much on the
in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989). Bawcutt does deal extensively with captives. He
treats them as an alternative to other devices which retain risk to some extent. However,
Bawcutt does not expressly equate captive arrangements with self-insurance. P. BAwCUTT,
supra note 28, at 26.
180. Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 248 n.308 (quoting from Mobil Oil's trial
transcript. Record at 2427, 2452-54, Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555
(1985) (No. 358-78)).
181. Captives in both Canada and Great Britain apparently can generate expense
deductions for the premiums. Although the tax laws of those countries differ from U.S. tax
law, their attempts to determine the meaning of insurance under our common language
should be of some relevance.
The Canadian courts have considered at least two captive cases. See Consolidated-
Bathurst Ltd. v. The Queen, 87 D.T.C. 5001 (Fed. Ct. App. 1986), rev'g in part and affg
in part, 85 D.T.C. 5120 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1985); Bonavista Cold Storage Co. v. Minister
of National Revenue, 83 D.T.C. 89 (Tax Review Bd. 1983). Although the Consolidated-
Bathurst court found that a captive arrangement, including a capitalization or indemnity
agreement by the parent, negated a critical element of insurance, the court stated that the
"adoption of [the economic family] concept would amount to a wholesale disregard of sep-
arate corporate existence" and the court was therefore "unable to say that in the 1975
taxation year [which lacked an indemnity agreement] risk did not shift and was not distrib-
uted." 87 D.T.C. at 5007.
A result similar to that in Consolidated Bathurst prevails in Great Britain. At an
early point, an author observed that the British tax authorities lack the authority, either
judicral or legislative, to attack the form of the captive arrangements. Finney, Captive
Insurance Companies - A United Kingdom and United States Perspective, 1980 BRIT.
TAX REV. 115, 127-29. This is consistent with the observation of another author that the
British tax law is generally less aggressive than United States tax law in policing tax avoid-
ance transactions. See Tiley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines: Corporations and Conclu-
sions, 1988 BRIT. TAX REV. 108. It is my understanding that the British tax authorities do
not challenge the deductibility of premiums paid to captives for reasons such as those de-
scribed in this paragragh. See Finney, supra, at 125-129.
182. Valuation is problematic, with widely divergent values often asserted for a given
enterprise. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 1-33 (1987); R. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 453-54 & n.30 (1986). Generally, one would think that asset value is not
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efficiency of its operations as on the amount of its assets.1 3 At
best then, the net worth approach represents only a rough approx-
imation of the economics of captive transactions.
Even if one believes that the Service is correct that economic
reality controls and the net worth explanation is substantially cor-
rect, the net worth approach does not take the economic family
concept as far as it needs to go. The explanation breaks down
most clearly in the case of a brother-sister corporation insuring
with another such subsidiary, a circumstance that has long troub-
led the Service in developing its approach. 8 4 Such an affiliate does
not suffer a loss in net worth when the captive pays a loss on its
account. However, in economic reality, the risk and premiums did
not leave the affiliated group and the substance of Spring Canyon
Coal is still offended' 85 (if the affiliates are all collapsed together).
The Service, and the cases which borrow from its economic family
approach, such as Mobil Oil and Stearns-Roger, would therefore
conclude that there is no insurance' 8 despite the lack of effect on
as relevant as the company's ability to earn profits for its shareholders. Id. at 453.
183. Professor Taylor, in criticizing Rev. Rul. 88-72, 1988-2 C.B. 31, clarified in,
Rev. Rul. 89-61, 1989-3 I.R.B. 4, which deals with a captive writing substantial amounts
of unrelated business, argues that:
The underlying value of the captive . rests with its operation as an insurance
business. Any losses the parent and other insureds incur are predicted to a large
extent and accordingly are reflected in the premiums the captive charges. As a
result, the underlying value of the captive ought not to fall just because the
captive pays a claim to the parent. In fact, the value of the captive, using a
literal balance sheet approach, may actually increase because of a recent or ex-
pected influx of premium income from the various insureds or because losses are
less than predicted.
Taylor, supra note 7, at 450. Corporate lawyers concerned with valuation techniques also
consider earnings prospects more probative of value than asset value. See V. BRUDNEY &
M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 182, at 1-33; R. CLARK, supra note 182, at 453.
184. It was once suggested that if the Service could not devise a better way of han-
dling cash exchanges between brother-sister corporations than by "characterizing such
transfers as a dividend from the 'brother' (corporation) to the 'parent' (corporation) and
contribution of capital from the parent to the 'sister' (corporation), the Service should re-
consider the whole idea of denying the [Code section 162(a)] deduction." Gen. Couns.
Mem. 35,629 (January 17, 1974).
185. An expanded description of the problem shows that it is somewhat deeper. Gen-
erally, there is no problem with brother-sister transactions, subject to scrutiny under sec-
tion 482, because one's deduction is the other's income. In the captive situation however,
one's deduction is not offset by the other's income due to subchapter L. Thus, viewed from
the group perspective, the tax effect is the same as allowing a deduction for self-insurance.
The Spring Canyon Coal principle is, therefore, offended. See Spring Canyon Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930), aff'g 13 B.T.A. 189 (1928).
186. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985); Stearns-Roger
Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985).
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net worth.8 7
This weakness of the net worth approach is shown by the Tax
Court's handling of the brother-sister situation. The Tax Court
has recognized that the economic family concept infringes on the
general application of Moline Properties,"8 and has not been per-
suaded to adopt the net worth approach. 89 When faced with a
brother-sister fact pattern in Humana, the Tax Court recognized
it as being within the scope of the concern that prompted its adop-
tion of a recharacterization approach.190 However, the Tax Court
could not rely on the economic family approach or its net worth
approach variant to recharacterize the premium expense. Instead,
it disallowed the deductions because to do otherwise "would exalt
form over substance and permit a taxpayer to circumvent our
holdings by simple corporate structural changes."'' This type of
action by the court is simply ad hoc decision-making with no
guiding principle or control.
In this light, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeals
seized upon this factual context and reversed the Tax Court in
Humana. Even the line drawn by the Sixth Circuit, however, is
not fully satisfying. The decision fails to give clear deference to
either substance or form. If the captive arrangements are troub-
ling and the premium expense deduction should be denied for par-
ent-subsidiary arrangements, the deduction should also be denied
187. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985),
action on decision, 1986-007 (January 8, 1986). The action on decision stated that:
The fact that as, in effect, brother-sister corporations, any gain or loss of Con-
stance [the captive,] has no effect on the net worth of taxpayer does not justify
the court's conclusion that they were not members of a single economic family.
Brother-sister corporations are in the same economic family as much as are par-
ent-subsidiary corporations.
Id.
188. Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 963 (1985) (Hamblen,
J., concurring). See also id. at 967 (Gerber, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority can-
not disregard the nature of the transactions between separate corporations "without crash-
ing head on into the holding in Moline . . ").
189. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1032 & n.1 (1987).
190. Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), afl'd in part and rev'd in
part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989).
191. Id. at 213. Since Humana may have had a business purpose for its multiple
subsidiaries, it is difficult to characterize its chosen corporate structure as a simple attempt
at tax evasion or avoidance, thereby elevating form over substance. The Sixth Circuit, in
answer to the Tax Court, stated that it should "not focus on the relationship of the parties
per se or the particular structure of the corporation involved." Humana, 881 F.2d at 255.
The decision in Humana though, may do little more than encourage corporate families to
restructure to take advantage of the brother-sister analysis. See Adler, supra note 11, at 1.
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to brother-sister situations that present the same difficulties re-
garding substance. A distinction between parent-subsidiary and
brother-sister arrangements would be an unlikely point for tax law
to come to rest.
The examination of the brother-sister situation demonstrates
most clearly that there is a conflict between form and substance in
the captive situation. The appellate decision in Humana highlights
this conflict. The net worth explanation does not prove that eco-
nomic reality is the correct focus in all cases. Clever phraseology
will not solve the captive problem. If we are to resolve the matter
on a principled basis, we must fact some tough questions.'92
While defining insurance has initial appeal, it is not possible
to resolve the captive issue without implicitly importing notions of
anti-tax avoidance. The transaction is open to attack not because
of its terms, but because of the identity of the parties to the trans-
action and the provisions of subchapter L. If we truly consider the
corporations to be separate entities, economic reality will not suf-
fice either. For these reasons, it is necessary to turn to motive and
business purpose.
C. The Choice Between Form and Substance in Transactions
Between Affiliates
From the above conclusions, it is apparent that the tax law
faces a difficult issue involving the conflict between form and sub-
stance, and the appropriate point to choose between them in the
captive context. One cannot simply conclude that the tax law fa-
vors substance over form. The authorities giving life to that doc-
trine make it clear that it is not an unbounded general directive,
but one designed to address transactions that are generally with-
out business purpose.' 93 The entire concept of separate corporate
192. A former Department of Justice lawyer who participated in the trial of the
Mobil Oil case, and later wrote a law review article on the subject, apparently thought the
net worth concept was not a simple solution to a difficult problem. He started his analysis
by detailing the economic family idea and the net worth variation. He then proceeded for
another 37 pages in an attempt to reconcile the denial of the insurance premium expense
deduction with standard tax law principles. See Barker, supra note 3, at 284-324.
193. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, (1940); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935). In Smith, the Court disallowed a loss claimed by a taxpayer from the sale of
stock to his wholly owned and controlled corporation, noting that the government is not
bound to the form adopted by the taxpayer. Instead, it may look at actualities where the
transaction is deemed to be unreal or a sham. Smith, 308 U.S. at 476-77. As noted by
Learned Hand, this does not mean that the government can insist that economic reality
governs in all transactions between related taxpayers.
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entities, treated as such by the tax law, rests upon both a respect
of the form the taxpayer has chosen"" and the understanding that
in reality a separate corporation is but a legal fiction.' 95 Substance
is always contrary to transactions based on that fiction.
The corporate fiction has been broadly interpreted for valid
reasons. If such a fiction as Moline Properties is recognized and
relied upon by planners, its scope must not be so restrictive as to
undercut legitimate tax planning. 9 Tax planners have placed
great weight on the separate entity concept. In fact, tax lawyers
instinctively rely on the legal separateness of corporations. Most
assume without serious analysis that any two corporations can
enter into business transactions with the hallmark of an arm's
length transaction, and accomplish the same results or business
purposes as those made by unrelated parties. Indeed this promotes
the free conduct of transactions that are often beneficial to soci-
ety. 97 This leaves a wide range of transactions untouched and
governed by form, because some business purpose exists for the
great majority of standard business transactions. Due to the pre-
dominance of the business purpose concept, it has been difficult
for some tax lawyers to accept the government's view of captive
arrangements, even if one recognizes that the growth of captives
from the self-insurance concept indicates the existence of a tax
This language [referring to a quote from Smith] we later interpreted as meaning
that "the Treasury may take a taxpayer at his word, so to say; when that serves
its purpose, it may treat the corporation as a separate person from himself; but
that is a rule which works only in the Treasury's own favor; it cannot be used to
deplete the revenue .... " Again we were wrong; we neglected to observe that
the corporate "form" must be "unreal or a sham," before the Treasury may
disregard it; we had taken too literally the concluding language that it was the
"command of income and its benefits which marks the real owner of property."
This error was made plain in the third decision of the Supreme Court -
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner.
National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1944) (citations omitted).
194. See Bittker, supra note 140, at 713 ("[T]he Code accepts at face value so many
fictions (e.g., the separate identity of corporations, the independence of all members of the
same family, etc.), regularly imposing tax liabilities on this basis, that it impliedly autho-
rizes taxpayers to act on the same fictions.").
195. As Professor Bittker noted it was Justice Holmes who "said in rejecting a tax-
payer's request that the courts pierce a corporation's veil in a state tax case: '[lit leads
nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction it is a fiction created by law with
intent that it should be acted on as if true." Id. at 713 (quoting Klein v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930)).
196. It was argued long ago that certainty was so important that form should be
conclusive. See Underwood, supra note 142, at 341-42.
197. See Rice, supra note 140, at 1023.
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avoidance motive for the transaction. 19  The generous latitude
usually allowed tax planners in relying upon form can be illus-
trated by comparing the types of transactions between related par-
ties that have been challenged, even though such cases do not lend
themselves easily to generalization. 99
1. Using Section 482 to Restructure Transactions Between
Affiliated Corporations
Under section 482, the government can restructure transac-
tions among commonly controlled parties and consolidate dealings
between related corporations to reflect arm's length dealings when
the parties have disregarded corporate boundaries, or failed to
charge a competitive price for goods or services flowing between
the entities. 00 Otherwise, the separate existence of the corpora-
tions is respected.20 1
For example, a deduction for losses which are incurred when
one party passes off assets to another related party for the sole
purpose of creating a loss will be disallowed 20 2 because such trans-
actions have no purpose other than tax avoidance. However, nor-
mal business transactions between related parties involving ex-
tended performance on both sides, as well as potential nontax
benefits or detriments for the form chosen, are respected. 20 3 This
198. See generally Blum, supra note 159, at 495 & n.26 (tax avoidance cannot be
decisive if the corporation's primary motive was otherwise).
199. See Bittker, supra note 140, at 695, 704-06; Rice, supra note 140, passim.
200. See Your Host, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 10 (1972), affid, 489 F.2d 957
(2d Cir. 1973); Marc's Big Boy-Prospect, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1073 (1969), acq.,
1975-1 C.B. 2, affd sub nom. Wisconsin Big Boy Corp. v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 137
(7th Cir. 1971); Hamburgers York Rd., Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 821 (1964) acq.,
1965-2 C.B.5.
201. See V.H. Monette & Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 15, 36-37 (1965), aff'd, 374
F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1967); Bush Hog Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 713, 724-25
(1964), acq., 1964-2 C.B. 4.
202. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 475-76 (1940); Crosby Valve & Gage Co.
v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 148-49 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967);
National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 794 (1943); see also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (transfer of
assets by one corporation to another without a business purpose was a mere contrivance
and not a reorganization).
203. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 821, 823 (Ct. Cl. 1955)
(respecting sale of products by gasoline manufacturer to subsidiary retailer to escape later
effective manufacturer's excise tax where motive for sale at the time was to avoid higher
excise tax). Of course, a different result might be expected where corporate boundaries
have not been respected by the taxpayer. See Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557,
562-64 (10th Cir. 1940) (arriving at a different result than Standard Oil on facts involving
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result holds even if the transactions are purely financial, such as a
loan from one corporation to a related corporation even though
the borrowing party might later claim a deduction for the interest
expense.204 In those situations, the potential for income on one
side offsets the deduction on the other.
2. Application of Substance Over Form to Captive
Arrangements
Similarly, insurance involves not only the payment of the pre-
mium by one party, but also performance by the other in the
event of a loss as well as other insurance-related services. It can
also result in different treatment by state authorities or parties
doing business with the entity. As discussed above, several busi-
ness purposes may be served by a captive insurance corporation.
Thus, one cannot conclude that captive arrangements totally lack
a business purpose.
This review of authorities illustrates how difficult it is to dis-
regard a corporate entity, or to collapse a transaction among affili-
ated corporations to its substance, by relying upon either section
482 or a lack of business purpose. 05 Presumably, this is why the
government and the courts have not used such an analysis in cap-
tive insurance cases. 0 6 In order to chart a course for captive anal-
a "dummy" subsidiary), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 687 (1940). If the transaction does not
really effect what it purports to effect, form may be disregarded, especially in related party
transactions which are subject to special scrutiny. See Shaffer Terminals, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 16 T.C. 356, 364 (1951) (rent expenses between related parties not allowed when
prior sale and lease-back did not effect real sale as nominal seller-lessee retained effective
control of the property under the agreement), aff'd, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952).
204. See Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1956)
(allowing the deduction of interest charged on note between related parties).
205. Professor Taylor has summarized the principles in this area as:
[O]ur tax law generally pretends that [affiliated corporations] are economically
distinct because intercorporate payments are treated as if they had economic
substance. Various Code provisions and numerous cases operate to prevent re-
lated corporate taxpayers from taking advantage of this apparent fiction. The
general theme of these anti-abuse rules is that transactions generally will be
treated in accordance with their form for tax purposes if (1) a real transaction is
involved, (2) the transaction does not contain a disguised payment for something
else, (3) the consideration is reasonable, and (4) no terrible abuse occurs.
Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 451.
206. For example, the lower court in Stearns-Roger found the formation of and do-
ing business with the insurance subsidiary motivated by business necessity, and found sec-
tion 482 inapplicable. Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833, 836 (D.
Colo. 1984). The court then relied on the economic family argument to conclude that there
was no insurance. Id. at 836-38. By concluding that substance controls over form, the
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ysis among the anti-tax avoidance authorities, it is necessary to
extend the transactional analysis.
D. The Difference Between Insurance And Other Transactions
Between Affiliates - A Study of the Economics of Tax Abuse
Rather Than the Definition of Insurance
In order to disallow the premium expense deduction, insur-
ance transactions between affiliates must be distinguished from
those transactions which are respected. The focus should be on the
potential for abuse rather than theoretical definitions of insurance.
1. The Alleged Differences Between Insurance and Other
Transactions Between Affiliates
Those favoring the government's position see the need to ac-
count for the ability of affiliates to engage in other transactions." 7
These advocates base their argument on the idea that insurance is
different from all other transactions between affiliates. Because of
such alleged differences, "insurance" is asserted not to exist in a
purported insurance arrangement between affiliates.
Unfortunately, upon close examination this argument leads
us back to the same issues that began our analysis. The govern-
ment's position includes statements that insurance "can only be
understood in financial terms" and "deals solely with the downside
of business activities" whereas "other activities provide the oppor-
tunity for a profit in addition to a risk of loss."'2°a By the conclu-
Court of Appeals did not appreciably further the analysis. Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United
States, 774 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1985).
It has been suggested that the government has not simply argued that the captives are
shams with no business purpose, because that would not reach the captives covering unre-
lated risks. See Barker, supra note 3, at 289 n.85. It would be strange if correct theory and
doctrine are discarded because one party's burden at trial would be is eased in certain
cases.
207. For example, after proceeding through many of the arguments noted above,
Professor Barker turns to this kind of approach, but without stating that he is attempting
to demonstrate that the transaction lacks business purpose. See Barker, supra note 3, at
299-302.
208. Id. at 301. To the extent one wants to engage in abstract thought, one might
reflect on whether such observations distinguish insurance from loan transactions, or
whether these distinctions are in any sense relevant. In fact, the author has previously
observed, in response to arguments raised by the government's expert witness, that notes or
loans between affiliates have similar characteristics to those of insurance, and interest de-
ductions on such loans are allowed. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 250 n.106.
This observation has been seconded as demonstrating the flaw of the economic family the-
ory, and rebutting the idea that insurance is unique with respect to transactions between
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sion of such arguments, its proponents return to a form of the
economic family concept with question-begging statements about
the need to shift risk away from the enterprise,2 09 as if the insur-
ance company were not a separate legal entity. 10
These arguments leave even a sympathetic reader unsatisfied,
as indicated by the courts' failure to use them directly or explain
why they are relevant. 211 Thus, the issue cannot be resolved solely
by studying the theoretical definition of insurance in light of the
substance over form doctrine. Once it is accepted that a definition
of insurance will not resolve the captive issue, the testimony and
reports of the experts become irrelevant. In any event, these obser-
vations, based as they are on the assumption that the corporate
veil is pierced, offer little help in solving this basic issue. We
should not turn to economists and other experts, or try to define
insurance so as to avoid the conflict. Since it is basically the con-
flicting doctrines of tax law that need resolution, the lawyers and
the courts need to make the decision. 12
2. The Potential for Tax Avoidance in Captive Arrangements
Instead of pursuing elusive distinctions based on the defini-
affiliates. See Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 450.
209. Perhaps the most articulate published statement of the conclusions to be drawn
from the differences of insurance as recounted in the text is:
Insurance is therefore unique in that it is the mechanism for transferring a
feature of business which has only negative implications. When a business has
obtained insurance, it has quite clearly separated these negative financial impli-
cations from its operations. However, when a corporation retains the risk either
directly or indirectly through its insurance affiliates, the corporation has not sep-
arated these negative financial implications from its operations.
Barker, supra note 3, at 302. To the extent that this means that the negative effects will
affect the balance sheet, this seems to be the same as the net worth variation with its
limitations.
210. Considering a subsidiary corporation's life span from incorporation to liquida-
tion, one might say that the parent never parted with the premiums or the risk since it all
left the parent at one point, but returned later. However, the same statement could be
made for any transaction between affiliates.
211. The Mobil Oil court which heard these arguments, concluded that insurance
was a "unique risk transfer device" and that other "transfers between related corporations
which are acceptable for tax purposes are not relevant." Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States,
8 Cl. Ct. 555, 564 (1985). The court did not distinguish the other transfers on any princi-
ple other than its conclusory statements. Id.
212. One may recall an old story about a group stranded on an island with only a
can of food to sustain them. The other members of the party had various suggestions about
how to extract the food from the can, but the economist's answer began: "[A]ssume a can
opener." A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (2d ed. 1989).
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tions of insurance, we should focus on practicalities and common
sense. The arguments about the theoretical differences between in-
surance and other transactions obscure the major practical differ-
ence between insurance and other transactions, which is the poten-
tial for tax avoidance. The largest tax benefit comes at the start of
the transaction, as the deduction on one side is accelerated by the
premium arrangement 13 Moreover, this benefit is achieved with-
out the normal tax cost of a two- party transaction. The insurer
does not generate income because it can take an immediate de-
duction when it sets up reserves for "losses incurred," which is
still allowed on a discounted basis.214 In addition there is no down-
side for businesses contemplating a captive arrangement as com-
pared to self-insurance other than the burden of administrative
costs,215 even though some consequences may be different for
some of the affiliates if they have a contract labeled insurance.1 6
This practical difference of insurance, should be the focus in ana-
lyzing captive insurance arrangements.
E. Potential Resolutions of the Captive Issue Based on Anti-
Tax Avoidance Analysis
The special tax advantages captives provide under subchapter
L 21 are the reason for the concern and suspicion that surrounds
their use. Due to this unique situation, captives present a poten-
tially abusive arrangement that may warrant attack by the Ser-
vice. Recognizing this point, there are two possible ways to resolve
the single-parent captive issue and remain within the normal
framework used for evaluating transactions that have both a tax
avoidance potential and an asserted business purpose.
1. Respecting the Form of the Captive Arrangement
One approach would be to conclude that form in such cases is
substance, therefore Moline Properties prevails. There may be
213. See O'Brien & Tung, supra note 3, at 683-84.
214. See I.R.C. §§ 832(b)(5), 846 (Supp. V 1987).
215. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 257.
216. The brother-sister situation, discussed above is one situation involving a poten-
tial economic difference. Depending on the relative resources of the affiliates, a claim may
be paid that would not otherwise be paid. See id. at 249. See also Abramowitz & Allen,
supra note 97, at 332 n.42 (in insolvency proceeding of insurer, all insureds have equal
priority in having claims paid, so for insurer writing unrelated business, owner-insured may
receive "more or less than the capital and premiums it had committed to the company").
217. I.R.C. §§ 801-46 (Supp. V 1987); see supra note 6.
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some concern that the tax advantage is disproportionately large
relative to the non-tax economics of the transaction. But perhaps
we should not be concerned about it since this benefit has been
expressly provided to insurance companies by subchapter L of the
Code. Congress should make any necessary corrections, since it
was Congress that initially decided that insurance companies
should be treated differently than other taxpayers.21 The belief
that this tax treatment is simply "too good to be true" is simply
not relevant, and any tax avoidance motive should be ignored.219
This conclusion is further supported by the overall approach
of the Code to affiliated corporations. The Code permits a group
to elect consolidated treatment, and then polices abuses in trans-
actions between affiliates by specific provisions such as section
482, which essentially reduces the terms of the transactions to an
arm's length deal.2   One may conclude that the presence of this
tax benefit is not troublesome and does not merit judicial interven-
tion by denial of the premium expense deduction.
Additionally, this result has support in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. For insurance companies operating under the amend-
ments, the deduction for losses incurred must be discounted to a
present value amount, 221 in contrast to the prior allowance of a
full face amount of losses to be paid in future years.222 If the dis-
counting is properly done, the insurer would receive treatment
similar to that allowed to taxpayers who can take a deduction only
in future years for such liabilities, even if that later deduction is
for the face amount of the liabilities. This conclusion derives from
the general proposition that a deduction currently for the dis-
counted present value of liabilities to be paid in the future, is the
economic equivalent of a deduction in the future for the face
amount of that liability. 223 Thus, with the potential for abuse re-
duced by the 1986 amendments, there is even less of an anti-tax
218. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 245-57.
219. See Humana, 881 F.2d at 254 (substance over form analysis cannot be used
whenever the Service "feels that a taxpayer is taking advantage of the tax laws to produce
a favorable result"). This sort of argument has also been used in support of abandoning the
business purpose doctrine as a judicially imposed requirement. BUSINESS PURPOSE Note,
supra note 157, at 1096.
220. See Greene, Tax Problems, supra note 40, at 260 & n.19; Sachs, supra note 3,
at 60.
221. I.R.C. §§ 832, 846 (Supp. V 1987).
222. I.R.C. § 832 (Supp. V 1987).
223. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 233; Gunn, Matching Costs, supra
note 26, at 31 n.144; Jensen, The Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 254.
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avoidance reason to look behind the form of captive
arrangements.224
This deferential treatment of captive arrangements appeared
unlikely in light of the number of court cases disallowing the pre-
mium expense deduction, at least until the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Humana. The value judgment of the decision makers (appar-
ently in fact, if not in word) had, up to that time, been to give
economic reality priority over form, at least with respect to the
single parent-single insured captive arrangement that operated
under the former version of subchapter L. For that reason, we
should develop the reasoning necessary for a second potential ap-
proach that reaches a different result.
2. Inquiry Into the Existence of a Significant Non-Tax Goal
In order to reach the conclusion that at least some captive
arrangements should be reduced to economic reality, further ex-
planation is required. The business purpose line of cases leads us
to elevate the anti-reserve accounting/self-insurance cases over
Moline Properties. The reason for such a result is probably the
high potential for tax avoidance in this situation. For the years
prior to the 1986 amendment to subchapter L, Congress' retention
of tax advantages to insurers should not be taken as a sanction for
continued tax avoidance which the courts can address if the abuse
undermines tax policies clearly articulated by Congress. 5 In any
event, no one has argued that the existence of captive insurance
companies was contemplated or sanctioned by Congress when it
established the original subchapter L rules.
Controversies in taxable years governed by the former version
of subchapter L, illustrate the need to use a business purpose anal-
ysis in light of the potential for tax avoidance. The possibility of
abuse is reduced for years controlled by the 1986 amendments to
subchapter L, but an argument could still be made that an avoid-
ance potential remains. The ability to use a method of computing
income denied to other taxpayers raises the suspicion that some
advantage may be gained. At least one writer has concluded that
224. See Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 451.
225. Congress has shown increasing concern over time value of money problems, a
category into which this issue fits. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 461(h), 483, 1271-1275 (Supp. V
1987) (recently revised or created sections addressing different aspects of the time value of
money).
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such an advantage exists after the 1986 reforms.226 For example,
the complex rules of subchapter L may still provide such an exam-
ple in the discounting process for reserves, as the discounting is to
be done based on the applicable federal rate that is derived from
federal government borrowings.227 Because the creditworthiness of
other borrowers is usually inferior to that of the government, the
theoretically correct discount rate which is adjusted for higher
risk would exceed the applicable federal rate, therefore the deduc-
tion would be overstated. Moreover, the insurance industry may
yet succeed in otherwise subverting tax reform,228 and there is no
reason why captive insurers should benefit from that
circumstance.
For insurance arrangements subject to either the present or
former versions of subchapter L, aggressive anti-tax avoidance
analysis is required in order to challenge the taxpayer's position.
This attack on captives could draw on the anti-tax avoidance prin-
ciples derived from cases recognizing that transactions designed
simply to create a tax loss for the group, without an economic loss,
are subject to special scrutiny.229
This framework requires that we judge the sufficiency of the
asserted business purpose and closely examine the motives of the
taxpayer, rather than trying to determine if insurance is theoreti-
cally present. As a leading commentator has summarized, we
could compare the "tax reduction objective" of the taxpayer with
its "non-tax objectives," and place the burden on the taxpayer to
show "the existence and significance of any non-tax objective."230
Using this analysis, "tax avoidance" exists "where the non-tax
goals are of insufficient weight as balanced against the tax reduc-
tion goal," and does not exist where there is a "demonstration that
226. See Rolfe, Captive Insurance Companies: Disguised Self-Insurance?, 65 TAXES
154, 161 (1987). This conclusion seems to be based on the ability of the insurer to take a
current deduction in at least some amount. There was no inquiry into the potential equiva-
lence of that deduction to a future deduction of a greater amount.
227. See I.R.C. §§ 846(c)(2), 1274(d) (Supp. V 1987).
228. See generally Sheppard, Property and Casualty Insurors Attempt To Under-
mine Tax Reform, 40 TAX NOTES 450 (1988) (legislation proposed by the insurance indus-
try would repeal the loss reserves discounting provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
229. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); National Sec. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943). The Sixth Circuit in Humana, interpreted such cases
as meaning that "a court cannot disregard a transaction in the name of economic reality
and substance over form absent a finding of sham or lack of business purpose." Humana,
881 F.2d at 255. This interpretation requires a lack of business purpose before the transac-
tion may be reduced to its substance.
230. Blum, supra note 159, at 516-17.
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the action in question did serve or plausibly could have served a
significant non-tax goal." '' Such a test does not provide a precise
test for all cases, as some with particular potential for tax avoid-
ance may require "weightier non-tax goals than do others," and
with some cases we may even "regard the plausibility of a particu-
lar non-tax objective as so low that we eventually fashion a gen-
eral rule that precludes ever giving any weight to that
objective. 213
An example of disregarding potential non-tax purposes due to
the presence of a highly tax sensitive transaction exists in one of
the leading cases dealing with economic reality in the tax law.
Knetsch v. United States"3 has been interpreted as holding that
the purported non-tax goal of borrowing the face amount of an
annuity, purchased in order to create an option to annuitize a sum
in the future, with the hope interest rates would later drop so that
refinancing could be acquired at a rate below that of the annuity,
"was not sufficiently plausible to merit consideration." 34
With a flexible view of "business purpose," we could answer
the captive issue in a manner that is responsive to the general re-
actions to such arrangements. An approach would be to say that
this is a highly tax sensitive situation where the asserted business
purposes are simply insufficient to outweigh the tax avoidance
purpose. Form does not control235 where the asserted business pur-
231. Id. Professor Blum noted that "[A]Ithough our law has never developed an all-
embracing principle that every action must pass an anti-tax avoidance threshold before
qualifying for favorable tax treatment, traces of such a notion have been read into numer-
ous statutory provisions." Id. at 515. Some commentators had suggested that "such illusive
criteria" as motive were difficult to depend upon when not specified in the statute. See
Sutherland, Taxpayers' Motive as a Basis for Taxability, 8 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 990, 991
(1950). Blum's analysis demonstrated that this proposition was of "doubtful validity."
Blum, supra note 159, at 515 n.80. This is also shown by his use of the Knetsch case as
related in the text infra, accompanying notes 233-34.
232. Blum, supra note 159, at 517.
233. 364 U.S. 361 (1960). See supra text and accompanying notes 152-54 (discuss-
ing Knetsch).
234. Blum, supra note 159, at 517-18. See also Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A
Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 135 (finding that the transaction
had no benefit other than tax avoidance permits disregard of transaction but court's char-
acterization of the transaction as a sham does not aid the analysis).
235. Professor Blum also noted a general problem:
The purposeful activity approach may conflict with another principle of our
tax system. In some situations, . . . we may wish to permit the form of a trans-
action to govern its tax consequences without an inquiry into whether non-tax
goals are served by use of the particular form. It might appear that the two
policies could be reconciled by holding that where form is to govern, it is to do so
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poses are as limited as those described above.
3. Application of Anti-Tax Avoidance Analysis to Captive
Arrangements
Perhaps requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate that, subjec-
tively, their purpose was to shift risk to the captive would suffice.
In the captive context though one might conclude that the enor-
mous potential for tax avoidance outweighs any plausible business
purpose to acquire insurance. An asserted business purpose is usu-
ally measured by whether the asserted non-tax goal could plausi-
bly be achieved under the circumstances or whether "one in the
actor's position could reasonably have believed that an asserted
non-tax objective would be served by the course of conduct."2 6
Courts may even require that the actor subjectively entertained
the non-tax goal at the time of the transaction.23 7
In this light, the asserted business purpose of acquiring insur-
ance has some problems. A manager buying insurance must have
the purpose of shifting risk. While the corporations may be con-
sidered separate entities in terms of analyzing the economics of
the arrangement, no manager in a corporate group could subjec-
tively entertain the thought that by passing his risks off to an affil-
iate he has shifted risk to another. As an employee of the group he
must view the entire group as the relevant firm. This interpreta-
tion of the intentions of managers is bolstered by the view of the
only if the action itself is purposeful. Accepting such a doctrine, however, would
amount to abandoning the notion that in certain situations form alone is to con-
trol, regardless of any other considerations.
Blum, supra note 159, at 519.
236. Id. at 523. For example, in Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582
(1959), the Tax Court stated that:
We are convinced . . . from our study of all the facts and circumstances that
none of the alleged advantages in the use of multiple corporations . . . consti-
tuted any actual business purpose in the instant case. The alleged business pur-
poses impressed us simply as a lawyer's marshaling of the possible business rea-
sons that might conceivably have motivated the adoption of the forms here
employed but which in fact played no part whatever in the utilization of the
multiple corporation structure.
Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. at 597-98.
237. See Blum, supra note 159, at 523 & n.105 ("[o]ccasionally, courts appear to
insist that the asserted business purpose must have activated the transaction in question").
See also Weyl-Zuckerman & Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 841, 847 (1955)("[i]t must be
shown by satisfying evidence that the alleged business purpose was in fact entertained as a
motivating factor by petitioner or its responsible representatives"), affid, 232 F.2d 214 (9th
Cir. 1956) quoted in Blum, supra note 159, at 523 n.105.
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managers responsible for the formation of captives, that they are
engaged in a form of self-insurance." 8
In fact, most large business corporations exploring risk man-
agement alternatives do not desire to pay the price required to
shift substantial amounts of risk, even when using unrelated insur-
ers. This becomes apparent when considering retrospectively rated
policies, the predominant form of unrelated insurer coverage for
large businesses. 23 9 Such businesses typically seek retrospectively
rated arrangements with premium arrangements so variable that
no real risk is shifted.240 Among the reasonable choices available
to a large business corporation, a choice involving real risk shift-
ing is not often on the table. The business purpose analysis must
then shift to secondarily asserted purposes.
Those purposes often constitute an impressive list,"4 but
closer examination casts doubt on their importance. For example,
better claims control and a desire to make a profit in the insur-
ance business, do not necessitate the coverage of related risks with
full insurance coverage. In addition, lowering costs by providing
direct access to the reinsurance market is often cited as a reason
for formation of a captive.242 But retention of the risks, through
either initial coverage and retention or reinsurance by the cap-
tives, is at odds with this asserted reason for using a captive.
Moreover, the secondary business purposes could be satisfied by
ceding away the related business on the reinsurance market, an
arrangement that would permit a current deduction under the
Service's ruling position.243 Finally, in terms of assessing the ac-
tual extent that such purposes motivate the captive arrangement,
it is common knowledge that despite the possibility of listing sev-
eral non-tax purposes for a captive, "the single reason that domi-
nates all others in making decisions regarding the formation,
238. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 CI. Ct. 555 (1985).
239. Brief of Appellant at 44-45, Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d
414 (10th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1773) (summarizing testimony of expert witnesses of both
parties).
240. Industry representatives might dispute this conclusion, but it can be inferred
from literature in the area. See Davis, IRS Targets Retrospectively Rated Insurance Pro-
grams, CASH FLOW 37, 38 (April 1987) ("retros", in order to secure the deduction for the
insured, need to have more realistic premium ranges than those currently being written); R.
GOSHAY, supra note 29, at 42 (retrospectively rated plans have such variable premium
arrangements to attract would be self-insurers).
241. Greene, Captives, supra note 165, at 627.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 634.
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form, or operation of a captive insurance company is taxes. ' 244
Thus, the secondary purposes are not sufficient and anti-tax avoid-
ance principles can operate to disallow the premium expense
deduction.
If the tax law took this direction in the captive cases, it would
be in line with a general trend in the area. There is a tendency to
reach results that achieve a certain economic justice even if the
form of a transaction is contradictory. A recent example is found
in the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Commissioner v. Bollin-
ger245 where the Court held that individuals, operating as a part-
nership, who used a corporation to borrow money in order to cir-
cumvent a state's usury law, could still deduct the interest on the
borrowing because the corporation acted as an agent with respect
to the loan. Although this result may seem fair and is supported
by the apparent designation of the corporation as agent on the
loan documents, it is somewhat inconsistent with the treatment of
the corporation as the borrower for state usury law purposes, 4
and the parties' failure to pay the corporation an agency fee for its
supposed agency services. In short, economic justice appears to be
gaining on form and the Moline Properties doctrine. 47
Measuring the tax avoidance in captive arrangements and
causing the allowance of the premium expense deduction to hinge
strictly on that factor, would also provide a tidy resolution for the
captive cases. If we could conclude with certainty that the current
version of subchapter L or some further refinement of it gave no
undue tax advantage to insurance companies, later cases consider-
ing such arrangements could distinguish any earlier authority that
dealt with arrangements possessing tax avoidance. At that point
the Service should be concerned that the insurers' recognize their
receipts as premium income, rather than nontaxable contributions
to capital under Revenue Ruling 77-316.248 Therefore, both the
income and deduction side of the transaction would have substan-
244. Id. at 628.
245. 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988).
246. For a general description of problems concerning the court's analysis in Bollin-
ger, see Note, The Continued Validity of the Separate Entity Doctrine: The Remaining
Issues After Commissioner v. Bollinger, 42 TAX LAW. 773 (1989).
247. See Tiley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines: Corporations and Conclusions,
1988 BRIT. TAX REV. 108, 109 (British observer notes that the "battery of doctrines [in the
U.S. tax law] easily brings about an intellectual climate in which the corporate form can
be disregarded").
248. 1977-2 C.B. 53.
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tial importance.
To date, the taxpayers and the government have sought an all
or nothing approach to the issue. The two sides are arguing past
each other without fully appreciating the merit in their opponent's
position. Captives present a difficult anti-tax avoidance issue and
should be addressed in those terms. In this light, either side's posi-
tion represents a plausible result depending on a subjective value
judgment. The recognition of this framework though, is more im-
portant than the result reached. 49
F. A Direct Anti-Tax Avoidance Rationale Allows for a More
Flexible Approach - The Impact on Group Captives and
Captives Writing Unrelated Business
The courts' attempts to define insurance in order to disallow
premium expense deductions in the captive cases has produced
some difficulties. Such an approach not only produces a conflict
with Moline Properties, but has failed to develop clear principles
distinguishing between types of captives based on the use of insur-
ance theory.
The use of anti-tax avoidance principles would allow for such
a reasonable distinction, if one concludes that some such arrange-
ments should not produce a deduction and others should. Pre-
mium obligations to some captives - such as those with unrelated
business or diverse ownership - may by use of anti-tax avoidance
analysis produce a deduction for its affiliates. Other captives may
not produce such a deduction.
The courts have indicated some willingness to draw such a
line.250 A recognition that the line is based on notions of anti-tax
avoidance would be advantageous in making such distinctions. It
would avoid the strained attempts to achieve justice by defining
insurance. Such a strain is apparent in the Tax Court's recent
249. The author at an earlier time concluded that form should prevail even in the
single-parent captive context, essentially for the reasons stated at the beginning of this
section. Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 245-57. In the several years since the writing
of that earlier Article, the growing number of single-parent captive cases arriving at the
opposite result appeared to render that analysis untenable. The Sixth Circuit's decision in
Humana though, lends support to the earlier Article. But, it is important to develop, as
that earlier Article did not, the full anti-tax avoidance analysis required to reach the result
achieved in nearly all of the single-parent captive cases. This exercise should emphasize the
great difficulty in dealing with this issue in other than conclusory terms.
250. See Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).
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Gulf Oil opinion, which appears designed to adopt an ill-advised
compromise approach.
If business purpose is emphasized to distinguish a single-par-
ent captive arrangement from insurance generating a deduction,
there is no need to reduce all captive arrangements to economic
reality. Whenever the asserted business purpose of shifting risk
appears insufficient in relation to the potential for tax avoidance,
the deduction for the premium may be denied. Factual variations
may produce different results as unrelated parties insure with or
own portions of the captive. That is not because of the nature of
insurance, which theoretically could exist between any two enti-
ties, but because at some point a sufficient business purpose in the
transaction can be found. This may not produce a bright-line dis-
tinction, but it is more honest and straightforward than attempt-
ing to hinge the denial on a strained definition of insurance.
This seems to be the general direction of the Tax Court
judges, even if their reasoning is based on other concepts. In the
series of Tax Court decisions starting with Clougherty Packing
and Humana and running through Gulf Oil, we see a reaction by
the Tax Court judges to a series of fact patterns ranging from
single parent captives and brother-sister captives, to captives with
unrelated business. It is apparent from Judge Gerber's dissent in
Clougherty Packing that a sizable minority of those judges would
emphasize Moline Properties and recognize an insurance transac-
tion with a captive that insures only its parent.2 51 From the major-
ity opinion in Gulf Oil it appears that the minority in Clougherty
Packing is joined by a few centrists, notably Judges Whitaker and
Hamblen, when the captive writes significant coverage for unre-
lated parties. 52 The lack of a consistent theory in these cases is
apparent as the author of each majority opinion attempts to jus-
tify its position by a definition of insurance, rather than admit*
that each is weighing a tolerance for tax avoidance against an as-
serted business purpose.
The difficulties with the line of cases began with Clougherty
Packing's lack of a clear reason for denying the premium expense
deduction in a single-parent captive situation. At its base, the ma-
jority in Clougherty Packing purports to be applying a
"recharacterization" test to determine that the transaction is not
251. Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 965-69 (1985) (Gerber,
J., dissenting), affid, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
252. Gulf Oil Corp., 89 T.C. at 1010.
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insurance.253 Usually recharacterization of the form of a transac-
tion involves a searching analysis of all the facts of a case, as
when debt is recharacterized as equity.254 Although these opinions
speak of considering all the facts of a particular case, the only fact
that appears to have any weight is ownership by the insured of the
insurer.
On the surface, the result sounds like the Tax Court has a
firm rule implicitly grounded in economic reality, but it does not.
Since the Clougherty Packing decision, a majority of the Tax
Court has consistently disclaimed the economic family concept.215
This leaves an absence of an expressed, unifying reason for the
results achieved in these cases. Ultimately, the cases seem to turn
upon an instinctive disbelief in the genuineness of the insurance
nature of the transactions between affiliates.
The matter was not made any clearer by the Tax Court's
handling of the brother-sister situation in Humana.2 58 The court's
holding that substance controls over form to prevent circumven-
tion of the holding in Clougherty Packing, might have been an
expected extension of the earlier case.25 7 But since we still lack a
rationale for the basic decision, Humana does not help a great
deal.
In any recharacterization test, one should expect that as the
facts change the results change. The Tax Court in its last major
captive case, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,258 indicated that
the presence of a sufficient amount of unrelated risks may change
the result of prior cases and allow the captive to insure its affili-
ates. This idea is neither based on economic reality nor a firm
respect of the Moline Properties concept of a separate corporate
entity. It is based on an offshoot of the definition of insurance and
253. Clougherty Packing Co., 84 T.C. at 959-60.
254. See Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 31
(1959); Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Anal-
ysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REv. 369 (1971). See also Stinnett's Pontiac Service, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 634 (11th Cir. 1984) (review of thirteen factors to be weighed
in determining if an advance is debt or equity); Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th
Cir. 1972) (same).
255. See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. at 956, 959 (1985),
aff'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987). For a later disclaimer of the net worth variant of the
economic family concept, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1032 n.1
(1987).
256. Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), affid in part and rev'd in
part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989).
257. Id. at 213-14.
258. 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).
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demonstrates the problems of attempting to handle this problem
by defining insurance.
1. Group Captives and Coverage of Unrelated Risks
The issue presented by a captive's coverage of unrelated risks
has been viewed by practitioners as a significant one since the Ser-
vice at one time gave that factor considerable weight. The pres-
ence of the unrelated risks gave the captive arrangement more
substance in the eyes of the IRS.25 A few years ago, this possibil-
ity appeared to be cut short by the Claims Court decision in Mo-
bil Oil Corp. v. United States2 60 which implied that such facts
were not material when it failed to discuss the issue in its legal
analysis of the case, even though the parties clearly presented
it.261 The Tax Court's majority opinion in Gulf Oil revived this
issue by stating, in dicta, that a sufficient proportion of unrelated
business can give the affiliates' transactions with the captive the
characterization of insurance, with the further suggestion that this
point could clearly be reached when the unrelated business ac-
counted for fifty percent of the premiums."'
In addition, the Gulf Oil majority apparently intended the
scope of their reasoning to reach group captives. The opinion
draws support for its fifty percent guideline from the Service's rev-
enue ruling sanctioning the premium expense deduction for premi-
ums paid to a group captive.26 a As noted above, the group captive
also presents a conflict, albeit a diluted one, between economic re-
ality and separate corporate entities. An owner-insured making a
contract with such an entity passes the risk to that entity, but
continues to bear a portion of the risk through its ownership posi-
tion. For that reason, it has been argued that the deduction for the
insurance premium should be partially denied to the extent of the
ownership interest, 64 much as Judge Goffe argued that the Gulf
259. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 242; Greene, Tax Problems, supra
note 40, at 260-63.
260. 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985).
261. See Barker, supra note 3, at 310; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 242.
262. Gulf Oil Corp., 89 T.C. at 1026-27 & n.14.
263. Id. at 1027 n.14 (citing Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107). The court stated
that the "sharing of premiums paid by unrelated insureds is similar in concept to a mutual
insurance arrangement." Id.
264. See Barker, supra note 3, at 306-07. Professor Barker notes that risks can be
divided, retained, or transferred by reinsuring. From this observation, Barker argues that a
contract with a group captive can be divided into insurance and self-insurance based on the
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Oil majority should allow the premium deduction to the extent of
the unrelated business. 65 The majority, consistent with the gen-
eral "all or nothing" approach of the cases, instead showed an
inclination to analyze the captive arrangement with unrelated bus-
iness for elements of risk shifting and risk distribution. 2"6  They
seem inclined to do the same with a group captive arrangement.267
Overall, the Tax Court's approach to these cases may not be
accurately described by its own words. The reluctance of the court
to accept the single-parent captive arrangement where only affili-
ates are covered, may be taken as an indication that a strong sus-
picion exists that these arrangements have been conceived as tax
avoidance vehicles. This feeling appears to be so strong that direct
factors (e.g., substance of the captive and the terms of the con-
tracts) will not be considered when determining if recharacteriza-
tion is appropriate. More is required to confirm that insurance was
sought. A majority of the court apparently feels that the presence
ownership in fact. The reinsurance process does not necessarily mean that Barker's point is
proved. In that process, the risks are both retained and transferred in part in form and
substance. With intercorporate transactions, a reason is needed to reduce matters to their
substance if the form is different.
One can reach this result by recalling the language used by the Ninth Circuit in
Clougherty Packing which states that the "net worth" of the insured parent falls "dollar
for dollar" by the amount of the loss paid by the captive. Clougherty Packing Co. v. Com-
missioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1987), affg 84 T.C. 948 (1985). One can con-
dlude that to mean that to the extent a loss affects the net worth of the parent, the payment
is not insurance. That approach is not recommended by this Article because it would over-
emphasizes an approach based on an asserted definition of insurance.
265. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1042, (1987) (Goffe, J., concur-
ring). While Judge Goffe concurred in the denial of the premium expense deduction on the
facts at issue, he objected to the dicta relating to significant unrelated business. Id.
266. "[T]o have insurance risk transfer and risk distribution must be present." Id. at
1023.
267. One might question whether the partial disallowance of premiums paid to a
group captive adequately reflects economic reality. If the entire arrangement is analyzed
for risk shifting, rather than an individual contract, none might exist. An owner-insured
does not feel the extent of his risks transferred, except to the extent of its ownership posi-
tion. However, by agreeing to enter the relationship and capitalize the captive with other
businesses with similar risks, it agrees to take on the risks of others, so it may have much
the same risk as before. The arrangement may spread a catastrophic loss in one period
among all the members. That may be somewhat illusory if the rates for the next period are
adjusted so that the insured pays for the losses of the group covered in the previous period.
Over time, in all forms of insurance, apart from the handling of catastrophic loss, the
premiums contributed by the group pay the losses. See Abramowitz and Allen, supra note
97, at 331-32; see H. DENENBERG, R. EILERS, W. HOFFMAN, C. KLINE, J. MELONE, W.
SNIDER, RISK & INSURANCE 143-44 (1964) [hereinafter H. DENENBERG]. Perhaps this
shows that insurance accomplishes less for an insured (i.e., is closer to self-insurance) than
is sometimes perceived.
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of unrelated business in a sufficient proportion can supply the nec-
essary confirmation of genuineness, being a factor extrinsic to and
independent of the affiliated group. There may be more confidence
in the genuineness of the arrangement as the amount of unrelated
business done by the captive increases because the captive then
shows a greater amount of independence from the corporate group
because its acceptance of outside risks indicates that it may gain
or lose by its insurance endeavors. When a large enough number
of unrelated parties purchase such coverage, the insurance pro-
gram may be accepted for what it purports to be. To put words in
the court's mouth: with that amount of unrelated business, insur-
ing with the captive has a substantial business Purpose outweigh-
ing the tax avoidance motive, and Moline Properties prevails.
This resolution of the captive cases with unrelated business is
not an unreasonable approach to such a difficult issue. But it
would be better for the court to recognize that this is what it is
doing. The present course involves great difficulties. Large results
appear to hinge upon fine distinctions in insurance theory, a the-
ory which is not equipped to deal with such cases. Emphasis is
placed on economic reality, yet that concept is often in conflict
with other tax principles relating to intercorporate transactions.
2. The Current Position of the Tax Court
Although one can understand the desire of the Tax Court to
compromise the issue at some point, the manner in which it is
accomplished is troublesome. It did not adopt either the economic
family approach or a Moline Properties separate corporate enti-
ties approach. An economic family approach would find that the
risks of the affiliates remain in the economic family and therefore
have not been shifted.268 Under Moline Properties, one might con-
clude that a risk can be shifted to any separate corporation. 269 The
Gulf Oil standard does not admit of such easy interpretation nor
yield such clear results. While the approach recommended in this
Article has a similar indefiniteness, the Gulf Oil approach has an
additional flaw. It is based on an interpretation of insurance the-
ory that does not appear principled or consistent.
The court used an unusual insurance theory to accomplish its
268. See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987),
aff'g 84 T.C. 948 (1985); Barker, supra note 3, at 300-15.
269. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Bradley &
Winslow, supra note 3, at 249.
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
result. The presence of insurance, according to the Gulf Oil court,
is based on the idea that one can combine its risks in a captive
with the risks of others and it may pay less in premiums than its
eventual losses."' According to those interpreting the Gulf Oil
court's dicta, even though an affiliate cannot generally shift risk or
insure with a captive by merely passing its risks to the captive, it
may achieve both under a "horizontal approach" to insurance in
which the "insureds shift and distribute risks among them-
selves. 271 The Gulf Oil court apparently believed that insurance
involves a shift of risk to other insureds through the distribution
process among the insureds.
3. Criticisms of the Tax Court's Definition of Insurance
The Tax Court's definition of insurance conflicts with the
great bulk of insurance theory, including the Sixth Circuit's opin-
ion in Humana, that views risk shifting as premised upon a verti-
cal transfer to an insurer, with distribution constituting a separate
issue.2 72 The Gulf Oil concept that risk shifting occurs through
270. The Gulf Oil court stated that:
By adding unrelated insureds, the pool, from which losses are paid no
longer, is made up of only the affiliated group's premiums. When a sufficient
proportion of premiums paid by unrelated parties is added, the premiums of the
affiliated group will no longer cover anticipated losses of all of the insureds; the
members of the affiliated group must necessarily anticipate relying on the premi-
ums of the unrelated insureds in the event that they are "the unfortunate few"
and suffer more than their proportionate share of the anticipated losses.
Thus, when the aggregate premiums paid by the captives, affiliated group is
insufficient in a substantial amount to pay the aggregate anticipated losses of the
entire group, the affiliates and unrelated entities, the premiums paid by the affili-
ated group should be deductible as insurance premiums and should no longer be
characterized as payments to a reserve from which to pay losses. Risk distribu-
tion and risk transfer would be present, and the arrangement is no longer in
substance equated with self-insurance.
Gulf Oil v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1027 (1987) (citations omitted).
271. See Bradley & Taten, supra note 70, at 297.
272. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir.
1986) (risk shifting means that one party shifts risk to another; and risk distribution means
that the party receiving risk distributes its liability in part among others); H. DENENBERG,
supra note 267, at 141 (risk transfer occurs when insured contracts with an insurer). See
also Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987) (since the
parent of a captive insurer retains an economic stake in whether a covered loss occurs, risk
of loss is not shifted), aff'g 84 T.C. 948 (1985). In Humana the Sixth Circuit stated that:
"[T]he tax court majority ignores the fact that risk shifting and risk distribution are two
separate and distinct prongs. The tax court cannot collapse the two prong test into one and
claim that the appearance of unrelated third-parties creates enough risk transfer."
Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247, 257 n.4 (5th Cir. 1989).
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risk distribution can be inferred from language in a number of
authorities, therefore it is plausible that the unrelated insureds
bore some risk.273 But language suggesting that risk shifting may
occur horizontally typically appears in cases when a separately
recognized entity contracted to relieve an insured of its risks, or
served as an intermediary in the pooling process. In contrast, if
the affiliates and the captive are merged, under the economic fam-
ily theory there is no separate entity to limit and make good the
losses of the affiliates. All of the losses of the affiliates are paid by
funds from the captive in the event that the affiliates suffer great
losses. The affiliates' risks before the policy period are as un-
bounded as they would be absent such a transaction. 4
The writing of unrelated business means that the affiliated
group has taken on additional risks as an insurer.2 75 To say that
this results in risk shifting is to say that an insurer transfers its
risks to the insured. Writers in insurance literature would say that
by accepting the additional risks, all other things being equal, the
captive's expected return is not changed, instead its absolute range
of uncertainty or variability is increased by the added risks.276
While it is true that the unrelated parties may contribute
funds that exceed their losses, this is possible in any insurance
arrangement. But the risks will generally be shifted to unrelated
parties only if they are systematically overcharged. 7
Aside from fixed premium arrangements with an unrelated
insurer, other insurance arrangements can be viewed as effecting a
transfer of risk. Some commentators state that pooling, by itself,
may transfer a risk.278 An example is the pure assessment mutual
273. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1950)
("manifestly this plan provides a distribution of the risk, for because of the plan the risk of
premature death is borne by the 1373 other members of the Exchange, rather than by the
individual") (emphasis added).
274. See Barker, supra note 3, at 312-15; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 243
n.88.
275. See Barker, supra note 3, at 312-15.
276. See Hofflander & Nye, Self-Insurance, Captives and Income Taxation, 51 J.
RISK & INS. 702 (1984). See also Barker, supra note 3, at 312-13 & n.204 (describes risk
distribution as a function of the quantity and quality of the risk accepted and retained by
insurance companies in exchange for the potential profit they can earn). Insurance and
finance scholars believe the requirement of outside business is immaterial in economic re-
sults, but they note other twists in tax law. Hofflander & Nye, supra, at 702 n.2.
277. See Barker, supra note 3, at 312; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 243
n.88.
278. See, e.g., H. DENENBERG, supra note 267, at 143 ("it might be argued that
pooling, per se, may involve a transfer of risk. . . .[for] example. . . the pure assessment
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that provides a premium arrangement subject to adjustment based
on the loss experience of the group.21 9 It may be argued that pool-
ing in such a case exchanges the risks of individual members for
the more predictable group experience.2 80 For our purposes, it
seems that for any one member of such an arrangement, the risk
has been shifted by the agreement of other members to the adjust-
able premium process, not solely by the pooling process.2 81 In the
mutual").
279. Id.
280. Insurance scholars apparently differ "as to whether the pooling of combination
of risks, per se," transfers risks in this manner. Id. at 143.
281. See Taylor, Captive Insurance, supra note 7, at 451. Some commentators have
argued that this position represents "one-dimensional economic views improperly ignor[ing]
the more relevant fundamental dynamics of premium pooling." Abramowitz & Allen,
supra note 97, at 331. They suggest that pooling unrelated risks within the captive shifts
risks of the captive's affiliates and that this position which the dicta in Gulf Oil espoused,
should be reaffirmed. Their conclusion is based on observations in the insurance literature
to the effect that all insurance is in a sense mutual insurance because the group bears the
losses through the premium pooling fund and, thus, the "insured" is also an "insurer." Id.
at 330-33 & n.33 (citing inter alia C. KULP, supra note 30, at 10; A. MOWBRAY. R.
BLANCHARD & C. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE - ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 372 (6th ed. 1969); D. REINMUTH, THE REGULATION OF RECIPROCAL INSURANCE
EXCHANGES 11 n.5 (1967)). They then note that for stock insurers, loss experience will
affect premium rates for later periods so that as a group, insureds will pay the losses in the
long run. Therefore in any period each insured in effect assumes the risks of the others
through premium pooling. They conclude that the captive owner's risks are "part of the
pool . . . and thereby are shifted to the group." Id. at 331.
Messrs. Abramowitz and Allen fail to establish that their observations about pooling
prevail over other aspects of the definition of insurance. The insurance literature generally
seems to assume, sometimes explicitly, that the transfer of risk occurs by a contract be-
tween two parties rather than through the pooling process. See, e.g., H. DENENBERG, supra
note 267, at 141 ("Insurance is defined ... as the business of transferring pure risk by
means of a two-party contract."). Even where insurance authorities do not clearly express
this concept, only an interpretation of their comments as requiring some form of coverage
by a separate insurer could produce the reduction of uncertainty or limitation as losses that
is specified in their definitions of insurance. See, e.g., C. KULP, supra note 30, at 10-11
(discussing insurance by transfer of risk or combination with others); I. PFEFFER, supra
note 67, at 52 (Defining insurance as "(1) a device mechanism, technique or principle; (2)
designed to reduce the degree of uncertainty of the insured; (3) by means of the transfer of
particular risks."). The captive's group does not experience a reduction of the uncertainty
associated with its risks by the addition of unrelated risks to the pool. See Barker, supra
note 3, at 311-15 & n.204; Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 243 n.88. Finance and
insurance scholars note no economic difference is accomplished by the addition of unrelated
business. See Hoffiander & Nye, supra note 276, at 708-09.
Statements in some authorities to the effect that the insured is also an insurer should
not be read literally. A self-insurer can pool its exposures but has not transferred them. H.
DENENBERG, supra note 267, at 145. And unless the captive is considered separate from
the purported insured, there is nothing resembling the standard transfer of risk contem-
plated in the insurance authorities. The long run substantial similarity between self-insur-
ance, mutual insurance and insurance generally does not lead necessarily to the conclusion
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captive context considered by Gulf Oil, it is clear that the losses of
the operating affiliates will in any event be paid by those entities
or the captive. The other unrelated insureds in a captive arrange-
ment will not have their premium amounts adjusted as in a pure
assessment mutual. Thus, risk shifting through the distribution
process cannot be said to occur this way in the captive context.
The compromise nature of the analysis used by the Gulf Oil
court is apparent from the cases in which the court indicated that
the concept would result in risk shifting. The general test as set
forth by the majority is that insurance occurs "when the aggre-
gate premiums paid by the captive's affiliated group is insufficient
in a substantial amount to pay the aggregate anticipated losses of
the entire group, the affiliates and the unrelated insureds." '282 Al-
though the court held that two percent of the premiums as unre-
lated business was insufficient for the years in question, 83 it stated
that when fifty percent of the premiums come from unrelated
sources, "we cannot believe that sufficient risk transfer would not
be present."284 At some unknown point between those two figures,
the standard would be satisfied, yet there will not be anything
truly different occurring as the figure rises from two to fifty per-
cent. In this scenario, any choice is just an arbitrary line." 5 In-
deed, a financial study of the addition of unrelated business, in-
cluding up to fifty percent of the captive's coverage, concludes
that this amount of additional business does not result in a reduc-
tion of the affiliated group's risk.2"8
The indefiniteness of the Gulf Oil test may be the result of a
discontinuity between the test and its asserted rationale. The test
appears to turn upon the size of the unrelated business, but the
that more of these programs should be characterized as insurance. In order to retain the
significance attached by the Code to the concept of insurance, it is probably necessary to
retain the traditional aspects of that concept. See note 267 supra.
Despite these differences with Abramowitz and Allen's definition of insurance, I be-
lieve that they correctly observe that the government's response to the Gulf Oil dicta con-
flicts with Moline Properties and that the Tax Court was attempting to draw a line at what
might be regarded as a reasonable place. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 242-43.
282. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1027 (1987).
283. Id. at 1028.
284. Id. at 1027 n.14.
285. See id. at 1042 (Goffe, J., concurring) ("I question why, under the majority's
theory, some magical percentage of unrelated premium is critical . . ").
286. Reduction of the affiliated group's risk can only take place through a combina-
tion of unrelated business and other risk management practices, such as an increase in
policyholder surplus. This can be effected at figures much lower than fifty percent. Hof-
fander & Nye, supra note 276, at 707-08.
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rationale in part turns upon the variability of the risk. The court's
test implies that substantial unrelated business written by the cap-
tive indicates a commingling of funds to pay the risks of all, so
that an insured is not simply getting its money back to pay its
losses. 87 The court is willing to give partial respect to the separate
entity as long as there is some variability of risks between in-
sureds, but the variability itself is not the test.
This confusion could be avoided by an anti-tax avoidance
analysis. Theoretical definitions of insurance are ill-suited for ex-
plaining the different results reached by the Tax Court. Moreover,
the courts generally have exhibited a low level understanding of
insurance theory. There is no reason that the federal courts should
be required to develop insurance theory in order to decide the cap-
tive cases, especially since the insurance scholars themselves are
not unanimous about the subject.
In order to confirm that the use of other insurance concepts
will not avoid the difficulties that have been encountered in the
use of risk shifting element to analyze captive insurance transac-
tions, those other aspects of insurance theory should be examined.
IV. THE ROLE OF RISK DISTRIBUTION IN RESOLVING THE
CAPTIVE ISSUE
While the captive cases have almost exclusively focused on
the risk shifting element of insurance, risk distribution may also
add something to the analysis. In addition, an expansion on risk
distribution may tell us more about the nature of cash flow pro-
grams in general.
A. Absence of Risk Distribution Will Not Be Availing in
Determining the Right to Deduction by a Purported Insured
An absence of risk distribution is a potential reason for de-
feating the characterization of an organization as an insurer. Al-
though the focus in the captive cases is generally on the perceived
absence of risk shifting,288 according to Revenue Ruling 77-316,
287. Gulf Oil Corp., 89 T.C. at 1026 ("risk of each policyholder is divided into small
units and is transferred to and distributed among the policyholders").
288. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1300 n.5
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'g 84 T.C. 948 (1985); Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d
414, 415 (10th Cir. 1985); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 CI. Ct. 555, 566 (1985);
Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 881
F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989).
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risk distribution is also absent in a single-parent captive arrange-
ment.289 Two Tax Court judges concurring in Humana Inc. v.
Commissioner suggested that the absence of risk distribution pro-
vided the majority with a better reason for its result.2 90 This sug-
gestion has not been explored further, even though one of these
judges, Judge Whitaker, wrote the majority opinion in Gulf Oil.291
One of the problems of a risk distribution analysis is the un-
certainty surrounding this element of insurance theory. Econo-
mists and insurance scholars are not unanimous on the issue of
risk distribution. While some claim that it is not even a necessary
element of insurance,292 other theorists state that it is necessary
but that its importance is exaggerated, as it actually is only a col-
lateral consequence of a basic insurance transaction. 93 A majority
of scholars ultimately conclude that some form of risk distribution
is required,294 but their phrasing of the risk distribution require-
ment often suggests that there is disagreement over whether the
distribution is to take place among insureds or the separate
risks.295
289. See Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53. The Service stated that risk distribution
was not present, but the cases do not focus on the distribution element. See Barker, supra
note 3, at 308. The Sixth Circuit in Humana observed that "[t]here is little authority
adequately discussing what constitutes risk distribution if there is risk shifting." Humana
Inc., 881 F.2d at 256.
290. See Humana Inc., 88 T.C. at 215 (Whitaker, J., concurring), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989); id. at 218 (Hamblen, J. concurring). The
presence of these judges in the Gulf Oil majority, with the opinion written by Judge Whit-
aker, may indicate the need for a reconciliation of the suggestions concerning risk distribu-
tion in Humana with the majority's opinion in Gulf OiL Interestingly the Sixth Circuit in
Humana found there to be risk distribution among the several corporate entities insured by
the captive. 881 F.2d at 257. This possibility of risk distribution when there are several
insured affiliates and the risk shifting hurdle is passed was suggested earlier. See Tinsley,
supra note 9, 148-49. The Sixth Circuit stated that risk distribution "might not result"
when a single-parent captive insures only its parent. 881 F.2d at 257.
291. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).
292. See 1. PFEFFER, supra note 67, at 46-49, 53; H. DENENBERG, supra note 267, at
143-45.
293. See A. WILLETT, supra note 67, at 79-80.
294. See, e.g., S.S. HUEBNER, PROPERTY INSURANCE 1 (rev. ed. 1933); J. MAGEE &
D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 20-22 (7th ed. 1964); A. MOWBRAY & R.
BLANCHARD. INSURANCE 23-29, 42 (4th ed. 1955).
295. Compare C. KULP, supra note 30, at 10 ("Essentially, insurance is a formal
social device for the substitution of certainty for uncertainty through the pooling of hazards
... a large group of hazard exposures is required to permit pooling."); R. KEETON,
supra note 53, at 6 ("[w]ith an increasing number of ventures within a combined pool, the
unusually . . . harmful experiences tend to stay more nearly in balance. ... ); and H.
DENENBERG, supra note 267, at 143-45 ("self-insurer can pool his exposures, but he is still
the ultimate risk bearer and therefore the scheme is not insurance") with A. WILLETT,
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1. The Origins of Risk Distribution
This disagreement among the theorists can be traced to the
roots of the distribution concept in the "law of large numbers."
This statistical principle permits increased predictability of ex-
pected aggregate covered losses as the number of individual cov-
ered risks increases. 96 Under this principle, the number of inde-
pendent risks covered is the key to predictability, not the number
of insureds. For example, predictability may be fairly equal for an
insurance company insuring the 10,000 cars of only one business
and a company covering 10,000 insureds with only one car
each.29 Thus, when an insurer has a sufficiently large number of
risks such that great variations in aggregate losses are unlikely,
and the premiums received plus its capital make it a viable risk
bearer, one can say that risk distribution is present regardless of
the number of insureds covered.
This interpretation is subject to criticism. It conflicts with the
general notion that insurance is often described as a pooling of
supra note 67, at 89 (describing risk distribution as involving the combination of insureds
and calling for distribution among separate entities); and R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, supra
note 30, at 22-23 (Insurance is a social device whereby the uncertain risks of individuals
may be combined in a group and thus made more certain small periodic contributions by
the individual's providing a fund out of which those who suffer losses may be reim-
bursed."). Willett considered the risk distribution aspect of insurance to be overemphasized
since it was only "an indirect result of insurance," which has as its primary purpose the
avoidance of uncertainty by the insured. A. WILLE-T, supra note 67, at 79-80. Professor
Kulp also refers to "all the insured persons in the group" which implies a pooling with
numerous parties. C. KULP, supra note 30, at 10. Professor Pfeffer finds Kulp's statements
to be unclear though, in regard to the necessity of a combination of parties. I. PFEFFER,
supra note 67, at 30-31.
296. For elementary statements grounding this principle in the study of statistics, see
T. WONNACOTT & R. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS & ECONOM-
ics 31-32, 55 (1972).
297. A. WILLETT, supra note 67, at 72. Willett stated that:
In many respects the increase in the number of distinct risks that an indi-
vidual producer carries is analogous to the combination of the risks of many
individuals. Other things being equal, a ship-owner who has a hundred ships,
and who carries his own insurance, is in the same economic condition as any one
of a hundred ship-owners, each possessing one ship, who have combined their
risks in a group through a system of insurance. The gain from the combination
of risks is due solely to the increase in the number of risks in the group; and if
that increase takes place through the growth of a single industry, the same ad-
vantage is obtained.
Id. See also id. at 75 (gain from combination could be had by large insured). Distribution
of such risks could also take place among risks covered in different policy periods. See
Kulp, Social and Private Insurance: Contrasts and Similarities, J. AM. Soc'Y CHARTERED
LIFE UNDERWRITERS 263, 267 (June, 1952).
[Vol. 40:79
CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES
risks by members of a group.298 The theoretical basis of the need
for a group originates from the argument that regardless of the
ability of a single entity to predict with some accuracy its own
losses due to its numerous risks, uncertainty could be further re-
duced if that entity combined its risks with others to create a still
larger pool.299 This group concept emphasizes what is called the
societal aspect of insurance.300 This view is ultimately based not
only on the addition of other parties for the benefit of the in-
sureds, but also upon the decrease in the amount of funds required
throughout society as a whole to be set aside to cover losses.301 If
a court wished to uphold a challenge to a captive arrangement by
use of a theoretical definition of insurance, a requirement of nu-
merous unrelated insureds would be a decisive choice and one
grounded in respectable insurance authority. However, there ap-
pears to be no movement in this direction. 02
2. The Problems With a Risk Distribution Analysis
A possible reason for the lack of movement relates to the def-
inition's theoretical inappropriateness for addressing the captive
issue. The definition of risk distribution that emphasizes the socie-
tal view adds little substance to the analysis of any given contract
with respect to the rights of the parties to the arrangement. From
the insurer's perspective, it can be said that adequate distribution
is achieved once there is a sufficient number of independent risks
from one insured to make the "law of large numbers" operate. At
that point, it is a viable operation even if it chooses not to insure
the risks of other persons. 3 From the insured's perspective, it has
already reduced its uncertainty and transferred its risks by paying
a premium and receiving coverage that protects it from greater
298. See S.S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 3 (5th ed. 1958); A. WIL-
LETF, supra note 67, at 73-77, 79-81.
299. See A. WILLETr, supra note 67, at 75.
300. See YALE Note, supra note 74, at 784.
301. See A. WILLETr, supra note 67, at 73-83.
302. One reason for the lack of movement toward this theory may be that it would
not support challenges to captives insuring sufficient numbers of unrelated insureds. It
would however, seem capable of allowing the Tax Court to make the distinction that the
court intended in the Gulf Oil dicta, suggesting risk shifting through the horizontal ap-
proach with sufficient numbers of unrelated insureds.
303. See I. PFEFFER, supra note 67, at 46-49; Denenberg Manuscript, supra note 53,
at 52. Authors such as Pfeffer and Denenberg note that insurers place principal reliance on
the "law of large numbers" to make the enterprise viable. Other factors cited as enabling
the insurer to assume the risks include: superior knowledge, capital, and prevention.
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losses. Although sufficient distribution among risks may assure the
insured that the insurer is financially capable of bearing the risks
purportedly transferred, this result can also be attained by any
insurer with capital sufficiently great enough to absorb losses,
whether or not other risks or parties are covered by that in-
surer.30 4 The transfer of the risks to a financially capable insurer
is the important part of the transaction for the insured,30 5 and any
requirement that uncertainty be reduced further is equivalent to
requiring that it make a better deal by locating and contracting
with an insurance company carrying a larger number of risks.
In light of this background, the course of the captive cases as
they consider the insured's side of the transaction is not surpris-
ing. First, it is not unusual for courts in captive cases to avoid as
uncertain a concept as risk distribution. 30 6 Second, it is not unex-
pected for the courts to speak in off-handed dicta of the "distribu-
tion of risk among insureds" in the course of early captive opin-
ions that turned on risk shifting,07 since a number of insurance
authorities use similar descriptions. Third, it is not surprising that
as the courts have become more familiar with insurance concepts,
they have tended to describe the distribution process as taking
place among independent risks rather than among unrelated in-
sureds.308 In fact, the Tax Court in Gulf Oil directly stated this
conclusion, basing its reasoning on the "law of large numbers."30 9
304. I. PFEFFER, supra note 67, at 46-49.
305. See id. at 46 (goal of insurance is to distribute losses); Denenberg, supra note
53, at 51 (from viewpoint of insured the primary emphasis is on risk transfer); YALE Note,
supra note 74, at 784 (risk shifting emphasizes individual aspect of insurance).
306. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. United States, 84 T.C. 948 (1985) (case
decided on risk shifting and not risk distribution grounds), 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
307. See, e.g., Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833, 836-38 (D.
Colo. 1984), aJfd, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985).
308. See, for example, the statement of the Ninth Circuit in Clougherty Packing Co.
v. Commissioner:
Distributing risk allows the insurer to reduce the possibility that a single costly
claim will exceed the amount taken in as a premium and set aside for the pay-
ment of such a claim. Insuring many independent risks in return for numerous
premiums serves to distribute risk. By assuming numerous relatively small inde-
pendent risks that occur randomly over time, the insurer smoothes out losses to
match more closely its receipt of premiums.
811 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987), affg 84 T.C. 948 (1985). This language may be
premised on the unspoken assumption that the numerous premiums would come from unre-
lated parties, but that fact is not necessary to the conclusion that it is the numerous inde-
pendent risks that accomplishes the distribution process for the insurer.
309. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987) (distribution occurs
among risks, and one insured with a sufficient number of unrelated risks can have sufficient
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This casual treatment of risk distribution as evidenced by the
Gulf Oil language is justified. The parties to the contract obtain
what such parties should expect from an insurance contract with-
out the presence of additional insureds: (1) the insured reduces its
uncertainty for a fee and (2) the insurer gets a fee for accepting a
risk it is financially capable of bearing. The additional inquiry into
the general societal effects of the contract, such as whether there
is risk shifting and risk distribution among insureds, would not be
an attractive question for courts to Attempt to answer when decid-
ing whether the insured can take a/tax deduction for the premium
expense.310 In this light, Weber Pdper's31 apparent acceptance of
theoretical risk distribution as sufficient, given the bare presence
of a number of apparently unrelated parties, is also understanda-
ble. 2 If it is the number of risks that causes the "law of large
numbers" to work and allows the insurer to spread its losses, the
presence or absence of that possibility could be answered by statis-
tical principles. The number of insureds that must be present,
under the other view, is unrelated to the ability to predict the
risks to achieve adequate distribution). See also Bonavista Cold Storage Co. v. Minister of
National Revenue, 83 D.T.C. 89, 103 (Tax Review Bd. Can. 1983) (law of large numbers
is based on number of risks, not numbers of insureds).
310. A simple risk shifting contract may be classified as a guaranty, whereas the
acceptance of numerous such contracts may constitute the business of insurance, thus al-
lowing the insured to deduct the premiums paid. See Note, What Constitutes Insurance?,
23 CORNELL L.Q. 188, 188 (1937) (Insurance contracts are created by engaging in spread-
ing contractual risk over a number of people as opposed to a guaranty, which only shifts a
duty.); Note, An Analysis of "Insurance" and "Insurance Corporation", 36 COLUM. L.
REv. 458, 458 n.10 (1936) (there is authority for the idea that only general operations of
insurance and not isolated transactions are subject to insurance regulation). See also
Denenberg Manuscript, supra note 53, at 83-85 (facts of isolation and lack of distributive
scheme, should be only one factor considered when deciding if it is insurance).
311. United States v. Weber Paper Co., 320 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1963).
312. The same absence of an in depth inquiry occurred in the Sixth Circuit's
Humana opinion, which held that risk distribution is required and suggests that it must
take place among numerous insureds. The court, however, merely stated that: "[W]e see no
reason why there would not be risk distribution in the instant case where the captive in-
sures several separate corporations within an affiliated group and losses can be spread
among the several distinct corporate entities." 881 F.2d at 257. If that is the level of scru-
tiny to be given to the issue, it poses no difficulty of analysis.
The Weber Paper decision, however, appears to be a flawed application of insurance
principles, since the issue should be the number and independence of the risks assumed by
the insurer, matters not addressed in Weber Paper. Id. The insurer could fulfill its obliga-
tions in Weber Paper since, under the Service's view, it merely had to return the funds each
insured gave it. Overall this would seem to be a deposit arrangement rather than a risk
shifting arrangement. Depending upon the time frame used for reference, the same conclu-
sion could be applied to the other insurance arrangements discussed in this Article, but the
Service generally has not pursued this argument.
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losses.
This line of thought leads to one conclusion. The presence or
absence of risk distribution should not be relevant in determining
whether the transaction constitutes insurance from the standpoint
of the insured for tax purposes. As indicated above, even among
those insurance scholars who define insurance to include a combi-
nation of risks from numerous insureds, conclude that for the in-
sured, risk shifting and the reduction of uncertainty is the essence
of insurance.313 The insurer's failure to cover the risks of other
insureds, thereby further reducing uncertainty and possibly premi-
ums, suggests that a covered insured may simply have made a
poor deal by contracting with that insurer.3 14 Similarly, the in-
sured's failure to pay a high enough premium so as to leave some
funds "in the pot" may mean it merely made a good deal. Those
circumstances alone should not cause courts to deny insurance
characterization to an insured.
Indeed, the concept of risk distribution is best understood in
the aggregate. It is naturally thought of as involving a combina-
tion of risks assembled and borne by an insurer. Thus, if the con-
cept has any bearing on the captive insurance issue, it is from the
perspective of the captive insurer's characterization as an "insur-
ance company." It is essential to the insurer that it be treated as
an insurance company under subchapter L.315
313. See A. WILLETT, supra note 67, at 79 ("The purpose of securing insurance is to
avoid uncertainty. The insured buys security by the payment of a fixed premium, and after
he has bought it his condition is not affected by the number of losses which the insurer may
have to make good."); C. WILLIAMS & R. HEIN, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE
(1964). Williams and Hein state that:
Insurers are the major users of this device [of combination] for its own sake;
they insure a large number of persons in order to improve their ability to predict
their losses. In other words, the purchase of insurance, from the point of view of
the insured, is a transfer; from the view point of the insurer, it is a combination.
Id. at 43.
314. With the presence of large numbers and the accomplishment of risk distribu-
tion, the expected outcome for each loss does not change, but the deviation or uncertainty
decreases with the coverage of a greater number of risks. The expected losses figure does
not decrease by adding further risks, rather it increases. See Barker, supra note 3, at 312
n.204. For an insured, the premium charged is generally the expected loss plus a loading
charge. See Hofflander & Nye, supra note 276, at 703. In all forms of insurance, ulti-
mately the losses are paid, almost exclusively, from the premiums charged to the insureds.
See Abramowitz & Allen, supra note 97, at 331. If the insured is to recognize any savings
through insuring with a larger insurer, it must be that the premium rate from an insurer
with a larger number of risks would more nearly approach the expected mean for each
insured.
315. See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3; Greene, Tax Problems, supra note 40.
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The absence of risk distribution should play a limited role in
resolving the captive cases and cases involving other insurance
products with similar characteristics. Even if the Service were to
challenge the insurance company status of the arrangement, cap-
tives with large numbers of risks from various parties, or perhaps
even one very large insured, will generally be able to argue that
they satisfy a risk distribution standard that looks only to the
number of risks rather than the number of insureds. If this version
of risk distribution concept were to prevail, risk distribution would
not play a large role in these cases. In Gulf Oil for example, the
Service successfully challenged the taxpayer's deduction based on
a finding that there was no risk shifting. This is despite the fact
that the taxpayer had paid as much as $46 million in annual net
premiums,316 and claimed that it had achieved sufficient risk dis-
tribution considering only its own risks.3 17 Outside of the captive
context, third-party insurers will normally be able to satisfy the
standard by covering numerous insureds and risks. The lack of
risk distribution may be dispositive, however, when the captive in-
sures a small number of risks of its affiliates and unrelated parties,
such that the "law of large numbers" would not operate to make
the estimation of losses predictable. 8 Since this argument will
only reach a subset of captive arrangements, the government has
little incentive to argue aggressively about the lack of risk distri-
bution. The government's prior litigation tactics indicate a desire
to establish broad principles capable of reaching all single-parent
316. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1021-22 (1987).
317. Id. at 1046 n.4, 1046-47 (Nims, J., concurring). This argument appears to have
been part of a claim that the presence of risk distribution itself constitutes insurance, ap-
parently subsuming the risk shifting requirement. The argument was not vigorously pur-
sued because the Tax Court had held in Carnation that there cannot be insurance without
risk shifting. See Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400, 410 (1978), affg 640 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir. 1980).
318. Cf. Bradley & Taten, supra note 70, at 298 (single parent captive receiving 99
percent of its premium income from insuring a single risk of an unrelated party may not
have risk distribution under Gulf Oil). The circumstance described in the text resembles
the kind of example that Judge Whitaker, had in mind when he discussed the absence of
risk distribution and insurance, even though there might be risk shifting where one party
contracted "to indemnify an unrelated party . . . from a specific risk." Humana Inc. v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 217 (1987), (Whitaker, J., concurring), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Judge Whitaker assumed that "in
order for the transaction to be economically sound for both parties, the premium would
have to approximate the present value of the risk." Id. This is generally true of business
insurance contracts under an expected present value analysis of the aggregate of risks cov-
ered. See Hofflander & Nye, supra note 276, at 703.
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captives without regard to factual variations. 19
A somewhat broader and more appealing position for the Ser-
vice would be that there is no insurance (perhaps focusing on the
insurer's entitlement to treatment as an insurance company under
subchapter L) in the absence of numerous insureds among whom
the risks can be distributed. This view might be used to challenge
captive arrangements without the presence of unrelated insureds
and indirectly accomplish the same result as indicated in the Gulf
Oil dicta. This result can also be reached based on a respectable
interpretation of insurance theory.
Even though this course is hampered by the difficulties, out-
lined in the preceding paragraghs, of including a requirement of
numerous insureds as part of the element of risk distribution, the
first of the single-parent captive decisions to reach this issue, the
Sixth Circuit's Humana opinion, suggested that requiring numer-
ous insureds for risk distribution is appropriate.3 20 The court's ap-
plication of the test was, however, rather lenient. The affiliates of
the owner were counted as separate insureds. Without much anal-
ysis, the court simply concluded that "we see no reason why there
would not be risk distribution in the instant case where the captive
insures several separate corporations . . . and losses can be spread
among the several distinct corporate entities.3 21 Under this appli-
cation of the test, captive arrangements consisting of several cor-
porate affiliates will meet the numerous insureds requirement, en-
abling more captive arrangements to survive scrutiny than if
numerous insureds meant numerous "unrelated" insureds.
Given the difficulties of using the risk distribution element to
winnow the cases, it will be necessary to resolve the risk shifting
issue and to face the conflict with Moline Properties. The absence
of risk distribution is not legally dispositive, so that the Service
cannot count on this as a ground for attacking captive arrange-
ments. This suggests that other aspects of risk distribution should
be examined to see if they can conclude this inquiry.
319. Cf. Barker, supra note 3, at 289 n.85 (argument that captives are sham corpo-
rations lacking business purposes not acceptable to government as an attack on captives
since it is too fact specific, and would not extend to captives accepting risks of unrelated
parties); Bradley & Winslow, supra note 3, at 245-57 (government has pursued litigation
strategy in captive cases of establishing broad principles in weak cases in order to attack
more substantial arrangements later).
320. Humana Inc., 881 F.2d at 257. The court stated that a single-parent captive
insuring only the parent "might not result in risk distribution." Id.
321. Id.
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B. The Presence of Risk Distribution is Not Clearly
Implicated by the Captive Cases as a Ground to Deny an
Insurance Characterization to the Transaction
If the absence of risk distribution is unavailing as a means of
attack, the presence of risk distribution among an insured's own
risks may further produce some surprising suggestions. It is possi-
ble that the ability of an insured to achieve distribution among its
own risks may negate the insurance characterization of its trans-
action with an insurer. This prospect however, is only indirectly
present in one of the captive cases and is better developed outside
the context of the captive cases.
This prospect derives from some commentators' interpreta-
tion of the Gulf Oil standard that insurance is present when a
captive writes more than fifty percent of its business for unrelated
parties. Some have assumed that the standard is a safe harbor
indicating the presence of risk shifting for insureds.3 22 This inter-
pretation has been questioned where the insured owner of the cap-
tive has sufficient risks to have risk distribution among its own
risks. In that event, the "horizontal approach" to insurance is less
likely to work since the captive's owner probably will not have
losses greatly in excess of those anticipated. 32 3 If correct, this view
would be a major limitation on the reach of the standard. This
interpretation would mean that a large taxpayer, like Gulf Oil,
might not be able to insure with its captive because its own risks
are so numerous as to have attained a level of distribution.
Several reasons suggest that the court intended the fifty per-
cent figure only as a safe harbor and did not intend to imply that
the presence of risk distribution has the effect of denying the
owner of the captive the ability to insure with its captive. First,
even if a party's risks are sufficiently numerous to be reasonably
predictable within a range, it still may suffer more or less than its
proportionate share of losses. Second, it is difficult to comprehend
why the court stretched to provide this piece of dicta if it did not
intend some fairly firm standard.
Moreover, the Gulf Oil opinion contains nothing to support a
conclusion that the court intended to make the major statement
on insurance theory which has been suggested. Nothing in the
322. See Abramowitz & Allen, supra note 97 at 333; Bradley & Taten, supra note
70, at 298.
323. See Bradley & Taten, supra note 70, at 298 n. 11.
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opinion indicates that the court was aware of this potential con-
flict between its statements relating to risk distribution and risk
shifting. Indeed, the majority announced the standard in unequiv-
ocal terms.32 4 The size of Gulf Oil as a taxpayer should have sug-
gested to the court that any statements concerning risk distribu-
tion should be explicit. Gulf Oil generated an annual net premium
income as high as $46 million in one year.325 Given this size, it is
likely that Gulf Oil attained risk distribution among its own risks,
and it apparently made a similar argument at one point. 26 Under
these circumstances, one would expect the court to comment on
Gulf Oil's potential problem of shifting its risks under the hori-
zontal approach.
The possible ramifications of such an interpretation would
also cause a radical rethinking of insurance theory outside of the
captive insurance context. Assuming for the moment that the hor-
izontal approach to risk transfer and insurance is otherwise valid,
if an insured with risk distribution among its risks cannot shift its
risks under that method because its aggregate losses are reasona-
bly predictable, there is similar reason to doubt that such a party
could transfer its risks directly even by a fixed premium contract
with a third-party insurer. 21 Yet a leading insurance theorist long
ago observed that even a party with a large number of risks capa-
ble of distribution can achieve an economic gain by insuring
rather than self-insuring. 28 Such a party would be exchanging a
larger potential loss for a smaller certain payment in the form of a
premium, similar to other insureds. s29
324. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1027 n.14 (1987).
325. Id. at 1021-22.
326. Id. at 1046-47 (Nims, J., concurring) (Gulf argued that "risk distribution was
achieved both by the types of risks Insco insured and the parties who were insured. Gulf
maintains that this should be true regardless of whether the captive insured unrelated par-
ties"). Since Gulf's captive accepted only 2% of its premiums from unrelated parties in the
years in question, it seems as if Gulf presented the court with the idea that it had sufficient
numbers of risks for distribution. See also id. at 1046 n.4 (Gulf argued that risk distribu-
tion achieved risk shifting).
327. This might be thought to be a version of investment risk which according to the
Court in Le Gierse did not constitute an insurance risk. Helvering v. Le Gierse 312 U.S.
531, 542 (1941). This concept was mentioned in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States,
1984-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9803 (D. Kan. 1984), aff'd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.
1986), where the captive purported to cover a layer of liability that was virtually certain to
be incurred. The issue might be framed as whether the increase in numbers neutralizes the
risk in the manner that the offsetting contracts did in Le Gierse.
328. A. WILLETT, supra note 67, at 75.
329. The Gulf Oil majority did note several descriptions of insurance that need re-
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Nevertheless, a portion of such a large insured's coverage
may have difficulty with some aspects of the insurance definition.
Because of the large number of risks, any large insured is certain
to suffer a given amount of losses. To that extent, events are not
uncertain. These events may then be regarded as an improper sub-
ject of insurance, which is often described as covering only uncer-
tain risks.330
At this stage of development in the captive cases, such a con-
clusion should not be accepted as compelling. Although it is possi-
ble to use the terms in the manner described in the preceding par-
agraph,331 one can also reconcile these large arrangements with
the definition of insurance by observing that no event depending
on future action is absolutely certain and insurance in these situa-
tions at least reduces the level of uncertainty.332 Moreover, one
may also observe that the risk associated with any one property or
activity is completely independent and therefore not affected by
the fact that a group of risks is covered.3 3 Each individual risk
should be examined for purposes of determining the existence of
risk shifting. 34 It thus appears doubtful that the Tax Court in
conciliation with the statement in the text. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010,
1026 (1987). In numerous general descriptions, insurance is characterized as accepting
"each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability upon it." Id. at 1026 (quoting Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979)). It is also said that
insurance allows substitution of a "small, definite cost (the premium) for a large but uncer-
tain loss (not to exceed the amount of insurance) under an arrangement whereby the fortu-
nate who escape loss will help compensate the unfortunate few who suffer loss." R. MEHR,
FUNDAMENTALS OF INSURANCE 32-33 (1983). This language can be interpreted to mean
that each insured pays a premium that is only a small part of its potential loss. If a party
has a sufficient number of risks to be reasonably predictable in an aggregate amount, it is
not likely to find an insurer to cover them for a "slight fraction" of the aggregate amounts
within the expected range. This type of definition of insurance should be taken as simply
relating the facts in which insurance arrangements usually occur. It may be "a notion
necessary to make the scheme work, rather than a description of a generic conception of
insurance." Denenberg Manuscript, supra note 53, at 62. Denenberg describes one instance
in which the premium was sixty percent of the potential loss. Id. at 56-57, 62. As
Denenberg stated, the arrangement will not be practicable as the premium increases be-
cause the party will choose to self-insure rather than pay a premium that nearly equals the
potential loss. This does not mean that a theoretical definition requires a small premium as
compared to the potential loss. This merely suggests that at some point the risk becomes a
certainty.
330. See I. PFEFFER, supra note 67, at 52; A. WILLETT, supra note 67, at 71.
331. See A. WILLET-r, supra note 67, at 75.
332. See I. PFEFFER, supra note 67, at 46.
333. See R. KETON, supra note 53, at 7. In that sense, each potential risk is covered
at a "slight fraction" of its potential cost. A business may insure millions of risks and
perhaps only hundreds result in a loss.
334. If this issue was even considered by the court, this interpretation seems to be
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Gulf Oil intended to make a major statement to the effect that
large parties cannot purchase insurance.3 3 5
The interpretation of the Gulf Oil dicta described above may
represent the beginning of a promising line of analysis. But the
court's opinion gives very little support for that concept. It would
be premature to attempt to extract too much from it. In any
event, the proposition is better examined out of the captive con-
text, where there is no concern about the relation of the insurer
and the insured.
CONCLUSION
Under certain conditions, an affiliate should be considered ca-
pable of insuring with a captive insurer within its corporate
group.338 A definition of insurance, from the insured's view, should
focus upon risk shifting. That term should be defined simply as
the presence of a significant transfer from the insured to the in-
surer of one or more risks which present uncertainty. In order to
ensure that an effective transfer of such a risk has taken place, the
insurer must possess sufficient capital. The capital can be supplied
either by the insurance company or through premiums paid. This
ensures that the claims paid on behalf of any one insured do not
simply represent a return of capital to that insured. In contrast, to
be treated as an "insurer," a party must accept from one or more
sources, a significant number of risks so that the aggregate result
the Gulf Oil majority's view of uncertainty and risk shifting. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1026 (1987). The court stated that:
The premium allocable to each insured contributes to the payment of aggregate
losses whether or not that insured actually suffers any loss. The cost of future
estimated losses is capable of reasonably accurate estimation; what is uncertain
is the identity of the insureds (or properties) which will suffer losses.
Id. (citation omitted).
335. This should not be interpreted to mean that the risks are assumed by the in-
surer for less than their expected value. Judge Whitaker, the author of the majority's opin-
ion in Gulf Oil, seemed to imply in Humana that an arrangement where "the premium
would . . . approximate the present value of the risk" meant that it was equivalent to "a
reasonable self-insurance reserve." Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 190, 217 (1987)
(Whitaker, J., concurring), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989).
The expected value of an event, however, never changes; the addition of numerous risks
decreases the aggregate variability for the insurer. In practice, the insured "accepts a cer-
tain loss larger than the expected loss of its loss distribution (due to the loading of premi-
ums) in exchange for elimination of the variance of its loss distribution during the policy
period." Hofflander & Nye, supra note 276, at 703.
336. Gulf Oil Corp., 89 T.C. at 1024 (noting the technical ability of affiliates to
insure each other).
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to the insurer is cast with the law of averages such that a distribu-
tion and spreading of the risks occurs. The definition of insurance
for property and casualty insurance ought not be further embel-
lished to deal with special arrangements such as captives.
Insurance concepts are not useful in distinguishing between
purported insurance arrangements that the tax law should respect
from those that it should not. Captives are merely one of several
arrangements that can be structured with some of the characteris-
tics of insurance in order to gain the tax benefits that such a char-
acterization provides. It is difficult to scrutinize these arrange-
ments for such characteristics and be comfortable with the
decision.
The failure of all parties to fully recognize this problem has
caused difficulties and obscured the real issue. In considering the
captive cases, the courts have strained to base their denial of pre-
mium expense deductions on the absence of risk shifting. This pro-
cess distorts insurance concepts. The real concern of tax avoidance
has been ignored. We should not be defining insurance in these
controversies, but measuring our tolerance for tax avoidance.
In the captive context, the tax law faces a conflict between
economic reality and the form of the transaction. Because of the
existence of plausible business purposes for such arrangements,
captives present a difficult choice between form and substance. To
disallow the deduction, we must be willing to find that the as-
serted business purposes are outweighed by the potential for tax
avoidance.
Differences are beginning to develop among the captive insur-
ance cases in terms of the formulation of the definitional issues
and the results reached. The Humana case might have appeared
to be an obvious vehicle for resolution of the captive insurance
issue since it arguably produced a conflict between the circuits
and might have attracted the attention of the Supreme Court. 337
The government though, failed to file a certiorari petition in
Humana, perhaps because the facts in Humana were distinguisha-
ble from previous cases and they did not present the strongest case
for the government to present to the Court.338 Unless the govern-
337. See Taylor, Taxing Captive, supra note 3, at 859 (editor's note) (Humana in-
consistent with other captive cases and "continued litigation and eventual Supreme Court
review, absent Congressional intervention, is a virtual certainty").
338. See Adler, IRS Won't Seek Humana Review, Bus. Ins., Nov. 6, 1989, at 98,
col. 4.
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ment asks Congress to enter this conflict, 3 9 subsequent cases may
remove these difficulties and thus permit a majestic resolution of
the captive insurance issue by the Court.
In this conflict, the advocates have not been willing to admit
the merit in the other's position and an unproductive dialogue has
resulted. Perhaps the greatest contribution that presently can be
made is to point out the baffling nature of the issue. While a result
for either side can be justified, it is important for the logical devel-
opment of the tax law that the issue is faced directly. In the end,
this should be viewed as an anti-tax avoidance issue rather than
one involving the definition of insurance.
339. The government may turn directly to Congress as it did in the self-insurance
area following its defeat in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.
1983). See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
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